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Much scholarship in law and political science has long understood the 
U.S. Supreme Court to be the “apex” court in the federal judicial system, and so 
to relate hierarchically to “lower” federal courts. On that top-down view, 
exemplified by the work of Alexander Bickel and many subsequent scholars, the 
Court is the principal, and lower federal courts are its faithful agents. Other 
scholarship takes a bottom-up approach, viewing lower federal courts as 
faithless agents or analyzing the “percolation” of issues in those courts before 
the Court decides. This Article identifies circumstances in which the 
relationship between the Court and other federal courts is best viewed as neither 
top-down nor bottom-up, but side-by-side. When the Court intervenes in fierce 
political conflicts, it may proceed in stages, interacting with other federal courts 
in a way that is aimed at enhancing its public legitimacy. First, the Court 
renders a decision that is interpreted as encouraging, but not requiring, other 
federal courts to expand the scope of its initial ruling. Then, most federal courts 
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do expand the scope of the ruling, relying upon the Court’s initial decision as 
authority for doing so. Finally, the Court responds by invoking those district 
and circuit court decisions as authority for its own more definitive resolution. 
That dialectical process, which this Article calls “reciprocal legitimation,” was 
present along the path from Brown v. Board of Education to the unreasoned per 
curiams, from Baker v. Carr to Reynolds v. Sims, and from United States v. 
Windsor to Obergefell v. Hodges—as partially captured by Appendix A to the 
Court’s opinion in Obergefell and the opinion’s several references to it. This 
Article identifies the phenomenon of reciprocal legitimation, explains that it 
may initially be intentional or unintentional, and examines its implications for 
theories of constitutional change and scholarship in federal courts and judicial 
politics. Although the Article’s primary contribution is descriptive and 
analytical, it also normatively assesses reciprocal legitimation given the 
sacrifice of judicial candor that may accompany it. A Coda examines the 
likelihood and desirability of reciprocal legitimation in response to President 
Donald Trump’s derision of the federal courts as political and so illegitimate. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Given its legal and cultural significance, Obergefell v. Hodges 
has to be one of the most widely read and discussed Supreme Court 
decisions in recent memory.1 Yet judging from the reactions in the law 
reviews, the casebooks, the blogosphere, the media, and even the 
dissenting opinions in the case, no one seems to have emphasized a 
potentially significant feature of the majority opinion.2 The Court 
repeatedly implied that it was responding to developments in the 
federal courts, suggestions that were nothing but the truth. But they 
were not the whole truth. In all likelihood, the Court itself was partially 
responsible for causing those developments in United States v. Windsor3 
and its aftermath.4 What is more, the Court may have intended to cause 
those developments. 
In explaining why it had to decide whether states may prohibit 
same-sex marriage, the Court in Obergefell pointed to the existence of 
a circuit conflict.5 And in holding that same-sex marriage falls within 
the scope of the fundamental right to marry, the Court made clear that 
it was adopting the majority view in the federal district and circuit 
courts—all listed in Appendix A to its opinion.6 What the Court did not 
do is acknowledge that all of the federal court rulings in favor of same-
sex marriage came after Windsor. Nor did the Court acknowledge that 
its opinion in Windsor seemed tailor-made to generating a lopsided 
circuit split in favor of same-sex marriage. The Court in Obergefell 
seemed to be trying to legitimate its controversial conclusion in part by 
portraying federal court decisions concerning same-sex marriage as if 
they were entirely independent of its decision in Windsor, when in all 
likelihood they were not. 
 
 1. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 2. Research has not revealed an account like the one offered here. 
 3. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 4. On October 6, 2014, the Court denied certiorari in seven same-sex marriage cases, all of 
which had resulted in rulings in favor of marriage equality, thus allowing those decisions to go 
into effect. See Order List: 574 U.S., SUP. CT. U.S. (Oct. 6, 2014), http://www.supremecourt.gov/ 
orders/courtorders%5C100614zor.pdf [https://perma.cc/RR2Y-ZEDQ]. 
 5. See infra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 6. See infra note 48 and accompanying text. 
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The Court’s conduct in Windsor and Obergefell is not sui generis; 
it is generalizable in at least two ways, one common and the other 
uncommon. First, the Court often alters judicial precedent, impacts the 
course of legislation, or affects public opinion and then later cites those 
changes in support of its own further conclusions. In so acting, the 
Court often does not acknowledge that it played a role in producing 
those changes. Second, when the Court takes on issues that deeply 
divide Americans, it characteristically takes steps to protect its public 
legitimacy, often in ways that are not fully candid. One way in which it 
may do so is by interacting dialectically with other federal courts.  
The dialectical nature of the Court’s interaction with other 
federal courts in Windsor and Obergefell was also evident (with a 
notable twist) in the conduct of the Court that decided Brown v. Board 
of Education,7 the subsequent federal court decisions that expanded the 
scope of the Court’s holding in Brown to racial segregation in other 
public settings, and the Court’s unreasoned per curiams that validated 
the expansion.8 A similar dialectic was present (with an important 
difference) in the Court’s reapportionment decisions, beginning with 
Baker v. Carr9 and culminating in Reynolds v. Sims.10 By contrast, 
reciprocal legitimation has so far failed to result from the Court’s 
decisions in District of Columbia v. Heller11 and McDonald v. City of 
Chicago,12 although what the Court intended in those decisions is 
unclear at this point. 
The judicial phenomenon that this Article documents and 
generalizes can be understood as a process of reciprocal legitimation. 
The process is reciprocal because lower federal courts and the Supreme 
Court each enlist the support of the other. Specifically, district and 
circuit courts seek to legitimate their decisions by relying upon an 
initial Supreme Court decision (e.g., Windsor) as authority for 
expanding the scope of the decision, and the Supreme Court in a later 
decision (e.g., Obergefell) seeks to blunt threats to its own legitimacy by 
invoking those district and circuit court decisions as authority for 
validating the expansion.  
Reciprocal legitimation takes two basic forms: it is either 
intended by the Court as an original matter, or it is unintended. In a 
case of intended reciprocal legitimation, such as Brown, the Court first 
 
 7. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 8. For a discussion of the post-Brown per curiams, see infra Sections II.B.1 and IV.A. 
 9. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 10. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).  
 11. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 12. 561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
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intends for other federal courts to expand the scope of its initial decision 
and then later relies on those federal court decisions as authority in 
eventually validating the expansion. In a case of unintended reciprocal 
legitimation, such as Baker, the Court causes other federal courts to 
expand the scope of its initial decision without intending that result but 
nonetheless relies upon those federal court decisions as authority in 
eventually validating the expansion. This Article, while mindful of the 
perils of speculation absent internal evidence, will suggest that the 
Court may have intended reciprocal legitimation in Windsor. If that is 
correct, it is worth exploring why the Court deemed it desirable to 
proceed in that fashion. But even if the Court did not intend reciprocal 
legitimation in Windsor, it set the process in motion, and that process 
constitutes a potentially important part of how the American 
constitutional system functions. 
The process of reciprocal legitimation has not previously been 
recognized. The closest idea to it in the law review literature is 
Professor Richard Re’s astute observation that federal courts 
sometimes narrow Supreme Court precedent because of (among other 
possibilities) signals from the Court that the precedent should be 
narrowed.13 Re does not suggest, however, that in certain circumstances 
the Court may invoke the fact of such narrowing as authority for 
validating it.  
The analysis that follows has implications for constitutional law 
scholarship that emphasizes the role of political forces in identifying 
mechanisms of constitutional change, including Professor Bruce 
Ackerman’s theory of “constitutional moments,” Professors Jack Balkin 
and Sanford Levinson’s theory of “partisan entrenchment,” Professor 
Barry Friedman’s theory of the agency of public opinion in shaping the 
Court’s decisions, and Professors Robert Post and Reva Siegel’s theory 
of “democratic constitutionalism.”14 One lesson of recent gay rights 
litigation is that, to a greater extent than is recognized by any of those 
theories, constitutional change can be driven not just by political actors, 
but also by legal elites—by judges. Instead of simply responding to the 
gestalt or public opinion, judges on different courts may work together 
to actively shape public opinion through orchestration behind the 
scenes. 
 
 13. See Richard M. Re, Narrowing Supreme Court Precedent from Below, 104 GEO. L.J. 921 
(2016). For a review of both Re’s article and this one, see Doni Gewirtzman, The High Power of the 
Lower Courts, PUBLIC BOOKS (Dec. 7, 2016), http://www.publicbooks.org/blog/high-powerlower-
courts [https://perma.cc/3XBC-WNAN]. 
 14. For discussion of those theories, see infra Section III.A. 
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This Article also has implications for scholarship in the fields of 
federal courts and judicial politics. Much of that scholarship either 
studies the Supreme Court without regard to its relationship to other 
courts, or else conceives of the Court and other federal courts as relating 
hierarchically—as principal and faithful agent—and therefore as 
constituting distinct institutions with different jobs to do. In contrast to 
such top-down models, other scholarship takes more of a bottom-up 
approach, either viewing the lower federal courts as unruly agents or 
analyzing the phenomenon of issue percolation in the lower federal 
courts before the Supreme Court decides. As already noted, however, 
another lesson of recent gay rights litigation (and desegregation and 
reapportionment litigation before it) is that the Court and other federal 
courts interact dialectically in interesting ways; they are part of the 
same federal courts system—a system in which lines of communication 
and influence can run back and forth, not just down or up. If one models 
that system as consisting of both nodes and links between nodes, the 
nodes begin to look different—and sometimes appear more, rather than 
less, alike—when viewed in the light cast by the links. The dialectical, 
side-by-side model of judicial interactions developed in this Article is 
distinct from approaches that emphasize either top-down hierarchy or 
bottom-up resistance or percolation.15  
Part I documents the interaction between the Supreme Court 
and other federal courts beginning in Windsor and culminating in 
Obergefell. Part II generalizes by explaining that this episode is one 
instance of two larger judicial phenomena. Part III draws implications 
for the study of constitutional change and the study of federal courts in 
law and political science. Part III also identifies extensions of the model 
to state courts and non-judicial actors and to judicial phenomena like 
experimentation and learning, which can blend into reciprocal 
legitimation.  
This Article is primarily interested in identifying a judicial 
phenomenon and analyzing its implications, not praising or burying it. 
Nonetheless, reciprocal legitimation—especially, but not only, its 
intentional variant—implicates difficult questions about the 
circumstances in which, and the extent to which, it is permissible for 
judges to be less than fully candid about what they are doing.16 
Accordingly, Part IV normatively assesses the Court’s conduct in 
 
 15. For discussion, see infra Sections I.B and III.B.  
 16. See, e.g., David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731 (1987) 
(defending a strong presumption in favor of judicial candor and citing prominent scholars who 
have taken an opposing view); cf. Scott Altman, Beyond Candor, 89 MICH. L. REV. 296 (1990) 
(arguing that judges should be candid but non-introspective). 
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Windsor and Obergefell. The Conclusion summarizes the argument, 
and a Coda suggests that it is reasonable to anticipate—and to defend—
reciprocal legitimation in response to President Donald Trump’s 
repeated attacks on the legitimacy of federal judges who rule against 
him.   
Before proceeding, however, two clarifications are in order. 
First, for the most part this Article conceptualizes “the Court,” not 
individual Justices, as the relevant unit of analysis, even though it is 
familiar learning that a collegial court is a “they,” not an “it.” The 
Article proceeds in that fashion for two reasons. First, it is often 
impossible to know what recently happened at the level of individual 
Justices. For example, one suspects that Justice Ginsburg asked Justice 
Kennedy to include some equality reasoning in the majority opinion in 
Obergefell,17 but that is just speculation, and, even if true, it is also 
speculative whether Kennedy agreed to do so because he thought it was 
a good suggestion or because he wanted to avoid separate opinions from 
Justices in the majority. Second, the idea of collective intent is more 
coherent than is suggested by academic criticism of the concept (often, 
but not only, when analyzing claims about original intent).18 It 
sometimes (although not always) makes sense to view the members of 
an institution or organization as sharing an objective, particularly 
when the institution is composed of a small number of people.19  
Second, where to start a story depends upon one’s purposes in 
telling it. Just as Brown is not the beginning of the Supreme Court’s 
dismantling of an apartheid social order in the American South, 
Windsor is obviously not the beginning of the Court’s gradual insistence 
that gay people possess constitutional rights that government is 
required to respect.20 But Windsor is a useful starting point for 
documenting the reciprocal reliance between the Supreme Court and 
other federal courts that is the focus of this Article. If the focus were 
instead on the interactions between the Court and state courts 
 
 17. See infra note 262 (discussing the equality reasoning toward the end of the majority 
opinion in Obergefell). 
 18. See generally, e.g., Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 
60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980) (identifying problems that attend attempts to discover the original 
intent of the Framers); John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419 
(2005) (identifying problems that attend ascriptions of unitary intent to multi-member bodies).  
 19. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 194 (2010) (dismissing the argument 
that “there is no such thing as ‘collective intent’ ” as “bad philosophy, bad psychology, and bad 
law”); id. at 194–95 (“[T]o suggest that one can never meaningfully ask what Congress was driving 
at in this or that statutory provision because Congress is not a collective body is to deny that people 
can ever share a purpose.”). The “not” in the second parenthetical appears to be a drafting error. 
 20. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
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concerning same-sex marriage, a better starting point would be 
Lawrence v. Texas,21 including Justice Scalia’s dissent.22 As suggested 
by Appendix B of the Court’s opinion in Obergefell, and as explored in 
Part III.C, some state courts began invalidating bans on same-sex 
marriage after Lawrence. 
I. AN ACCOUNT OF WINDSOR AND OBERGEFELL 
A. Federalism as a Way Station 
As developed elsewhere, the Windsor Court appeared to use 
“federalism as a way station” by “combining equal protection reasoning 
with the analytical and rhetorical resources of federalism both to self-
consciously lean in the direction of marriage equality and to not yet 
embrace it entirely.”23 On the one hand—the hand that conceives of 
federalism as limiting federal power—the Court emphasized that the 
all-purpose restriction of marriage to opposite-sex couples in the federal 
Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”) was constitutionally suspect 
because of its extraordinary interference with state control over 
domestic relations law.24 That reasoning seemed to imply that the 
states, not the federal government, are authorized to decide who may 
marry whom. Chief Justice Roberts, in his dissent, so read the majority 
opinion.25  
On the other hand—the hand that used federalism in the service 
of living constitutionalism and emphasized the equal dignity of gay 
people—the Court celebrated the minority of states that were allowing 
same-sex marriage while ignoring the majority that were banning it; 
qualified its discussion of state control over domestic relations law by 
stating three times that states must respect constitutional rights; and 
emphasized (based on DOMA’s title, legislative history, and 
consequences) that the statute had the purpose, effect, and social 
meaning of demeaning the dignity of same-sex couples and their 
children.26 That reasoning seemed to imply that state bans on same-sex 
marriage are at least as constitutionally problematic as the federal ban 
 
 21. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562–606. 
 22. See id. at 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Today’s opinion dismantles the structure of 
constitutional law that has permitted a distinction to be made between heterosexual and 
homosexual unions, insofar as formal recognition in marriage is concerned.”). 
 23. Neil S. Siegel, Federalism as a Way Station: Windsor as Exemplar of Doctrine in Motion, 
6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 87, 144 (2014).  
 24. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693–94 (2013). 
 25. Id. at 2696–97 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 26. Id. at 2689–95 (majority opinion). 
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at issue in Windsor. Justice Scalia, in his dissent, so read the majority 
opinion.27 
Why did the Court issue such an opinion? As discussed further 
in the next Section, it is hazardous to speculate about the collective 
intent of the Justices in the majority absent access to the Court’s 
internal proceedings. But by resisting any dispositive “equality” or 
“federalism” interpretation and preserving for itself a certain Delphic 
obscurity, the Court in Windsor may have intended to generate a circuit 
conflict: there was something for both sides in the opinion, and the 
appellate courts were understood by the Court to be ideologically 
diverse. What is more, the Court may have intended to create a lopsided 
split in favor of marriage equality: there was much more in the opinion 
for gay rights advocates to use than their opponents.28 In addition, 
public opinion was moving with dispatch in favor of same-sex marriage, 
as the Court surely knew.29 
That, of course, is exactly what happened. Federal courts, in 
invalidating state bans on same-sex marriage, invoked Windsor in two 
primary ways. (This Article discusses the decisions of the federal circuit 
courts, not the district courts, both because there are fewer of them and 
because they are more influential.) First, the Supreme Court in 1972 
had held in a one-line summary decision that a state law preventing 
same-sex couples from marrying did not present a substantial federal 
question.30 In explaining why that decision, Baker v. Nelson, was no 
longer controlling, appellate courts invoked the Court’s decision in 
Windsor, which did not discuss Baker. “[S]ince Windsor was decided,” 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reported, “nearly every 
federal court to have considered the issue—including the district court 
below—has ruled that Baker does not control.”31 Typical was the 
 
 27. Id. at 2708 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 28. While this Article analyzes Windsor’s impact on federal courts, Windsor also empowered 
other actors who were engaged in the process: gay rights activists, litigants, lawmakers, state 
officials, and state courts. 
 29. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013), was decided alongside Windsor. The Court 
held 5-4—in an unusual lineup—that the official proponents of Proposition 8, which amended the 
California Constitution to prohibit same-sex marriage, lacked Article III standing to appeal the 
district court’s order invalidating Proposition 8. Hollingsworth is consistent with the 
interpretation of Windsor presented here. Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, who were in the 
majority in Hollingsworth, likely did not want to decide the constitutionality of a state ban on 
same-sex marriage at that time. By contrast, Justice Kennedy, who dissented (along with Justice 
Sotomayor, the fifth Justice in the Windsor majority), was prepared to reach the merits out of 
concern for the viability of the initiative process. But he likely would have decided the merits 
narrowly, perhaps by emphasizing Proposition 8’s withdrawal of a right that same-sex couples had 
previously enjoyed. For elaboration, see Siegel, supra note 23, at 135–40.  
 30. Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).  
 31. Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1206 (10th Cir. 2014). 
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reasoning of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which 
wrote that “[t]he Supreme Court’s willingness to decide Windsor 
without mentioning Baker speaks volumes regarding whether Baker 
remains good law.”32 
Second, circuit courts leaned heavily on Windsor in ruling in 
favor of marriage equality either on substantive due process grounds33 
or on equal protection grounds.34 For example, in holding that Virginia’s 
ban on same-sex marriage violated the fundamental right to marry, the 
Fourth Circuit reasoned that “Lawrence and Windsor indicate that the 
choices that individuals make in the context of same-sex relationships 
enjoy the same constitutional protection as the choices accompanying 
opposite-sex relationships.”35 And in holding that Idaho’s and Nevada’s 
bans on same-sex marriage unconstitutionally discriminated on the 
basis of sexual orientation, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit expressly applied heightened scrutiny,36 which it had previously 
read Windsor to require.37  
At the same time, almost every dissenting judge in those cases 
distinguished Windsor as a federalism decision.38 “In Windsor,” Judge 
O’Scannlain of the Ninth Circuit observed, “the Court struck down a 
federal law that intruded on a state’s prerogative to define marriage.”39 
“If anything,” he continued, “Windsor’s emphasis on the unprecedented 
federal intrusion into the states’ authority over domestic relations 
 
 32. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 374 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 33. See Kitchen, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014) (2-1) (relying upon Windsor in holding that 
Utah’s ban on same-sex marriage violates the fundamental right to marry); Bishop v. Smith, 760 
F.3d 1070 (10th Cir. 2014) (2-1) (relying upon Windsor in holding that Oklahoma’s ban on same-
sex marriage violates the fundamental right to marry); Bostic, 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014) (2-1) 
(relying upon Windsor in holding that Virginia’s ban on same-sex marriage violates the 
fundamental right to marry). 
 34. See Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014) (3-0) (relying upon Windsor in holding 
that Indiana’s and Wisconsin’s bans on same-sex marriage violate equal protection because they 
irrationally discriminate against same-sex couples); Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(3-0) (relying upon Windsor in holding that Idaho’s and Nevada’s bans on same-sex marriage 
violate equal protection because they unconstitutionally discriminate on the basis of sexual 
orientation).  
 35. Bostic, 760 F.3d at 377. 
 36. Latta, 771 F.3d at 468. 
 37. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471 (9th Cir. 2014) (3-0) (holding 
that Windsor requires courts to subject classifications based upon sexual orientation to heightened 
scrutiny). 
 38. Judge Niemeyer of the Fourth Circuit used Windsor somewhat differently. See Bostic, 760 
F.3d at 392, 396 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) (reading Windsor as recognizing “the inextricable, 
biological link between marriage and procreation,” and emphasizing that the “Court made no 
change as to the appropriate level of scrutiny in its more recent decision in Windsor”). 
 39. See Latta v. Otter, 779 F.3d 902, 908 (9th Cir. 2015) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from 
denial of reh’g en banc) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S 810 (1972)). 
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reaffirms Baker’s conclusion that a state’s definition of marriage 
presents no ‘substantial federal question.’ ”40 Along similar lines, Judge 
Kelly of the Tenth Circuit asserted that “Windsor protected valid same-
gender, state law marriages based on federalism concerns, as well as 
Fifth Amendment due process and implied equal protection concerns.”41 
“Given an unusual federal intrusion into state authority,” he reasoned, 
“the Court analyzed the nature, purpose, and effect of the federal law, 
alert for discrimination of ‘unusual character.’ ”42 
In the wake of those appellate decisions, the Supreme Court 
further nudged the federal courts in the direction of marriage equality 
by denying certiorari in all of them.43 The Court also remarkably 
declined to stay the judgments of courts in subsequent cases that ruled 
in favor of same-sex marriage.44 From a realist perspective, those last 
moves made it inconceivable that the Court would subsequently issue a 
decision effectively un-marrying thousands of couples it had just freed 
to marry. When the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
generated the split by reading Windsor as imposing no constitutional 
limits on the states,45 the Court granted certiorari. 
In resolving the circuit conflict, the Court in Obergefell listed in 
Appendix A the many federal court decisions that had addressed state 
bans on same-sex marriage; it did not acknowledge that those 
decisions—in contrast to the state legislation and judicial decisions 
listed in Appendix B—were overwhelmingly decided post-Windsor.46 
Nor did it acknowledge that all of the federal court decisions 
invalidating state bans were post-Windsor. The Court referenced 
Appendix A three times in its opinion. It explained that there was both 
 
 40. Id. 
 41. Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1235 (10th Cir. 2014) (Kelly, J., dissenting) (citing 
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013)).  
 42. Id. (quoting Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693); see Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070, 1109 (10th 
Cir. 2014) (Kelly, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (adhering to his views in Kitchen). 
 43. See Order List, 574 U.S., supra note 4 (citing the Order List from October 6, 2014). 
 44. See, e.g., Lyle Denniston, Court Won’t Add to Delay of Florida Same-Sex Marriages, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 19, 2014, 7:34 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/12/court-wont-add-to-
delay-of-florida-same-sex-marriages/ [https://perma.cc/L6HQ-2FCH] (“In refusing the request by 
Florida officials, the Court followed the pattern that it had maintained for the past two-and-a-half 
months of routinely turning aside requests to put on hold lower court rulings that had struck down 
state bans on same-sex marriage.”).  
 45. See DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 413–15 (6th Cir. 2014) (2-1) (upholding restrictions 
on same-sex marriage in Michigan, Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee using the following reasoning: 
“Why was DOMA anomalous? Only federalism can supply the answer. The national statute 
trespassed upon New York’s time-respected authority to define the marital relation . . . . Today’s 
case involves no such [divesting] of a marriage status granted through a State’s authority over 
domestic relations within its borders . . .”). 
 46. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608–11 (2015). 
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a split that needed resolving47 and a majority view in the circuits that 
it was adopting.48 The Court largely took itself out of the deliberative 
interactions it described.  
For example, in rejecting the argument that it should await 
further developments before declaring a right to same-sex marriage, the 
Court detailed the participation of almost every actor but itself in 
debates over same-sex marriage: 
There have been referenda, legislative debates, and grassroots campaigns, as well as 
countless studies, papers, books, and other popular and scholarly writings. There has 
been extensive litigation in state and federal courts. See Appendix A, infra. Judicial 
opinions addressing the issue have been informed by the contentions of parties and 
counsel, which, in turn, reflect the more general, societal discussion of same-sex marriage 
and its meaning that has occurred over the past decades. As more than 100 amici make 
clear in their filings, many of the central institutions in American life—state and local 
governments, the military, large and small businesses, labor unions, religious 
organizations, law enforcement, civic groups, professional organizations, and 
universities—have devoted substantial attention to the question. This has led to an 
enhanced understanding of the issue—an understanding reflected in the arguments now 
presented for resolution as a matter of constitutional law.49 
The Court portrayed the opinions of the federal courts as having been 
informed directly or indirectly by the arguments of litigants, lawyers, 
and society—not in part by the Court itself in Windsor.  
In sum, the Court in Obergefell invoked the authority of the 
many federal court decisions that had invalidated state prohibitions on 
same-sex marriage, which in turn had relied on the Court’s own 
decision in Windsor. The Court did not disclose the existence of any 
reciprocal reliance—of any reciprocal legitimation. It instead presented 
federal court decisions as independent developments to which it was 
 
 47. See id. at 2606 (“Indeed, faced with a disagreement among the Courts of Appeals—a 
disagreement that caused impermissible geographic variation in the meaning of federal law—the 
Court granted review to determine whether same-sex couples may exercise the right to marry.”). 
 48. See id. at 2597:  
With the exception of the opinion here under review and one other, see Citizens for 
Equal Protection v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859, 864–868 (CA8 2006), the Courts of Appeals 
have held that excluding same-sex couples from marriage violates the Constitution. 
There also have been many thoughtful District Court decisions addressing same-sex 
marriage—and most of them, too, have concluded same-sex couples must be allowed to 
marry. In addition the highest courts of many States have contributed to this ongoing 
dialogue in decisions interpreting their own State Constitutions. These state and 
federal judicial opinions are cited in Appendix A, infra; 
see also id. at 2593 (“Petitioners filed these suits in United States District Courts in their home 
States. Each District Court ruled in their favor. Citations to those cases are in Appendix A, infra.”). 
 49. Id. at 2605. 
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required to respond in order to ensure uniformity in the interpretation 
of important questions of federal law.50  
It is common, although not inevitable, for the Court to invoke 
the prevailing view in the circuits as confirming its own conclusion—for 
example, when it rejects the position of an outlier circuit.51 What is 
different about the phenomenon discussed here is that the Court, 
through its decision in Windsor, likely played a causal role in 
determining which view would prevail in the circuits. What is also 
potentially different is that the Court may have intended to do so. 
B. A Preliminary Defense of the Account 
The foregoing interpretation is unlikely to satisfy scholars who 
are skeptical of claims of subjective judicial intent—and for good reason. 
Absent “smoking gun” evidence, which is currently unavailable, it is 
impossible to establish the subjective intent of any—let alone all—of 
the five members of the Windsor majority. It remains possible that the 
Court was uncertain about what to do, was simply awaiting further 
developments and learning, and was pushing its decision off for another 
day, which came sooner than expected. That interpretation seems 
unable to account for the extent to which the majority opinion in 
Windsor leaned in the direction of marriage equality, but perhaps 
another interpretation can.  
It matters if the Court in Windsor intended what followed, both 
because it raises the question of why it acted with such an intent (see 
Part II.B), and because such an intent may affect a normative 
assessment of the Court’s conduct (see Part IV). But it also matters that 
reciprocal legitimation subsequently occurred regardless of the intent 
of the Windsor majority. That is, even if the Court in Windsor caused 
subsequent events without intending to do so, other federal courts still 
invoked its decision as authority for invalidating state bans on same-
sex marriage, and the Court in Obergefell still invoked those decisions 
as authority in validating the result that most federal courts had 
reached. 
 
 50. A different dialogue took place among judges on the appellate courts themselves, who 
invoked developments in sister circuits. See, e.g., DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 430 (6th Cir. 
2014) (Daughtrey, J., dissenting) (“These four cases from our sister circuits provide a rich mine of 
responses to every rationale raised by the defendants in the Sixth Circuit cases as a basis for 
excluding same-sex couples from contracting valid marriages.”). 
 51. See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Following Lower-Court Precedent, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 851, 
853 (2003) (“In reading the Court’s opinions, one sometimes finds statements to the effect that a 
particular decision accords with, or departs from, the views of most of the lower courts.”). 
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The foregoing interpretation of events is also unlikely to satisfy 
empiricists. It is difficult to demonstrate empirically the extent to which 
the Court’s opinion in Windsor caused the reactions of the federal courts 
in its wake (just as it is difficult to establish the causal relationship 
between those reactions and the Court’s opinion in Obergefell). Perhaps 
the Court and other federal courts were moving independently in 
response to the same general conception of human rights52 or the same 
changes in public opinion, which were reflected in the position of the 
Obama Administration that classifications drawn on the basis of sexual 
orientation warrant heightened scrutiny.53 Although this Article cannot 
rule out that possibility, it likely does not tell the whole story. The 
probable consequences of the Court’s decision in Windsor were 
predictable—and were predicted—at the time it was decided.54 
As Professor Katie Eyer observes, moreover, “[T]he history of 
gay equality claims in the lower federal courts suggests that such courts 
may be slower and more hesitant than the Supreme Court to make 
doctrinal moves responsive to broader shifts in constitutional culture, 
particularly in the absence of some clear doctrinal signal from the Court 
itself.”55 Windsor offered such a signal, even if (perhaps by design) it 
was not an entirely clear one. It was clear enough to embolden willing 
federal judges to go where they wanted to go—and where, perhaps, 
their grandchildren wanted them to go. (The fact that those federal 
judges wanted to decide in favor of marriage equality is what makes the 
legitimation reciprocal, as opposed to one-sided.) But the Court’s signal 
 
 52. The Court may be making such an appeal when it cites foreign law. See, e.g., Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005) (“Our determination that the death penalty is disproportionate 
punishment for offenders under 18 finds confirmation in the stark reality that the United States 
is the only country in the world that continues to give official sanction to the juvenile death 
penalty.”); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) (“The right the petitioners seek in this case 
has been accepted as an integral part of human freedom in many other countries. There has been 
no showing that in this country the governmental interest in circumscribing personal choice is 
somehow more legitimate or urgent.”).  
 53. See Katie Eyer, Lower Court Popular Constitutionalism, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 197, 215 
(2013) (“[T]he Obama intervention seems to have been received by the lower courts, in the absence 
of authoritative guidance from the Supreme Court, as a signal that heightened scrutiny is once 
again a respectable—if perhaps not mandatory—doctrinal approach.”). 
 54. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 23, at 133–34:  
Over the next year or two, some more socially conservative or cautious judges may 
uphold certain state bans on same-sex marriage by distinguishing Windsor on the 
grounds advanced by Chief Justice Roberts and discussed in Part 2. But one can also 
expect other such bans to continue to fall, generating splits of authority and returning 
the question to the Court . . . .  
In his Windsor dissent, Justice Scalia predicted that the Court would invalidate all state 
prohibitions on same-sex marriage in the near future. See infra note 236. 
 55. Eyer, supra note 53, at 216. 
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was not so clear as to effectively require unwilling federal courts or 
judges to go there as well.  
Is it accurate to characterize the Court as involved in 
persuasion, not compulsion, when it is an authority vis-à-vis the group 
(other federal courts) with which it is communicating? A skeptic might 
wonder what kind of communication from the Court would count as 
persuasion that would not also count as either precedent or strongly 
worded dicta. Such skepticism draws attention to the important point 
that hierarchy is always present to a non-trivial extent, and a fuller 
discussion of the issue must await Part IV.B. For now, it is worth 
reiterating that the Windsor Court seemed to go out of its way to offer 
something to both sides in the debate over same-sex marriage, even as 
it offered more to one side. In addition, there is a difference between a 
nudge and a shove. The Windsor Court, in essence, offered a nudge.  
II. TWO GENERALIZATIONS OF THE ACCOUNT 
Although the short amount of time that elapsed between 
Windsor and Obergefell may be uncommon and indeed dizzying, little 
else about the Court’s behavior in those cases is unprecedented. This 
Part identifies two ways, one common and the other not, in which the 
Court’s conduct constitutes one instance of more general judicial 
phenomena. 
A. Judicial Precedent, Legislative Trends, and Public Opinion 
First, when the Court seeks to alter substantially the course of 
the law, and even when it has no such conscious intention initially, it 
may affect the content of potential sources of legal authority—including 
judicial precedent, legislation trends, and public opinion—only to later 
invoke those changes in support of more aggressive doctrinal 
conclusions. For example, the Court in McLaughlin v. Florida justified 
its invalidation of a state law that punished interracial cohabitation 
more severely than intraracial cohabitation by citing (among other 
decisions) Brown v. Board of Education,56 whose holding a decade 
 
 56. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191–92 (1964): 
[W]e deal here with a classification based upon the race of the participants, which must 
be viewed in light of the historical fact that the central purpose of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was to eliminate racial discrimination emanating from official sources in 
the States. . . . Thus it is that racial classifications have been held invalid in a variety 
of contexts. See, e.g., . . . Brown v. Board of Education . . . . 
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earlier the Court had expressly limited to the field of public education.57 
Three years later, the Court invoked McLaughlin in striking down anti-
miscegenation statutes in Loving v. Virginia.58 Similarly, the Court in 
Roper v. Simmons overruled earlier precedent permitting the juvenile 
death penalty by invoking, among other things, its intervening decision 
in Atkins v. Virginia, which prohibited the execution of the 
intellectually disabled.59 
Examples of that kind of move abound not just in constitutional 
law, but also in the field of federal courts. For example, after the Court 
in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida held that Congress is barred 
from using most of its Article I powers to override the states’ sovereign 
immunity from suit in federal court,60 the Court in Alden v. Maine held 
that, given Seminole Tribe, it would be anomalous to allow Congress to 
use those same powers to abrogate state immunity in state court.61 
Dissenting, Justice Souter called out the Court for bootstrapping its 
way to an unjustified conclusion: 
The short and sufficient answer is that the anomaly is the Court’s own creation: the 
Eleventh Amendment was never intended to bar federal-question suits against the States 
in federal court. The anomaly is that Seminole Tribe, an opinion purportedly grounded in 
the Eleventh Amendment, should now be used as a lever to argue for state sovereign 
immunity in state courts, to which the Eleventh Amendment by its terms does not 
apply.62 
Using past decisions as authority for further extensions is broader than 
bootstrapping and is common.63 It is the progression of precedent 
 
 57. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (“We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine 
of ‘separate but equal’ has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.”). 
 58. 388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967): 
We have rejected the proposition that the debates in the Thirty-ninth Congress or in 
the state legislatures which ratified the Fourteenth Amendment supported the theory 
advanced by the State, that the requirement of equal protection of the laws is satisfied 
by penal laws defining offenses based on racial classifications so long as white and 
Negro participants in the offense were similarly punished. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 
U.S. 184 . . . (1964). 
 59. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574–75 (2005) (overruling Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 
U.S. 361 (1989), and relying in part on Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312–13, 317–21 (2002)): 
[T]o the extent Stanford was based on a rejection of the idea that this Court is required 
to bring its independent judgment to bear on the proportionality of the death penalty 
for a particular class of crimes or offenders, it suffices to note that this rejection was . . . 
inconsistent with the premises of our recent decision in Atkins. 
(citations omitted). 
 60. 517 U.S. 44, 44–46 (1996). 
 61. 527 U.S. 706, 752 (1999). 
 62. Id. at 800 n.33 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 63. Bootstrapping occurs when “an actor undertakes permissible action Y and thereby 
renders its action Z legally permissible, as the actor’s undertaking of Z absent Y would raise 
serious legal problems.” Stuart Benjamin, Bootstrapping, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., 2012, at 115, 
1-Siegel_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 5/1/2017 1:59 PM 
2017] RECIPROCAL LEGITIMATION 1199 
 
characteristic of common law constitutionalism.64  
When the Court leverages judicial precedent as justification for 
further expansions, it may seem relatively obvious (although see below) 
that the Court is responsible for having caused previous changes in the 
doctrine because the Court is citing itself. Likewise, the Court’s 
emphasis on reliance interests as one of several considerations in 
decisions about stare decisis transparently exemplifies the feedback 
loop discussed here. The Court explained in Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey that when it reexamines a previous 
decision, “its judgment is customarily informed by a series of prudential 
and pragmatic considerations designed to test the consistency of 
overruling a prior decision with the ideal of the rule of law, and to gauge 
the respective costs of reaffirming and overruling a prior case.”65 Among 
other questions, the Court asks “whether the rule is subject to a kind of 
reliance that would lend a special hardship to the consequences of 
overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation.”66 The Court is 
thus candid about its own previous role in causing other actors to 
behave in ways that it is currently taking into account in preserving a 
particular result.  
Another “Casey” factor that the Court considers is changes in the 
law: “whether related principles of law have so far developed as to have 
left the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine.”67 As 
justification for overturning precedent, the Court may invoke tensions 
in the doctrine and countervailing lines of precedent, even though it 
obviously contributed to those tensions. An example from constitutional 
 
116. Reciprocal legitimation need not be an instance of bootstrapping so defined. For example, it 
was not necessary for the Court to issue its holding in Windsor in order to render its holding in 
Obergefell legally unproblematic. Rather, it was Lawrence that deemed moral opposition to 
homosexuality an illegitimate state interest. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577–78 (2003) 
(“[T]he fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice 
as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice . . . .” (quoting 
with approval Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting))). Part of 
what is noteworthy about reciprocal legitimation is that the Court proceeds in stages even though 
it is not legally required to do so. On the other hand, if one defines bootstrapping in terms of the 
Court’s public legitimacy instead of its legal legitimacy, see infra Section II.B, then the instances 
of reciprocal legitimation discussed in this Article are also instances of bootstrapping, with the 
interesting wrinkle that multiple courts are involved in the process. 
 64. See generally DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010) (describing his theory 
of common law constitutionalism). For earlier expressions of his theory, see David A. Strauss, 
Common Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson’s Principle, 112 YALE L.J. 1717 (2003); David A. 
Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996). 
 65. 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 855. 
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law is Lawrence v. Texas.68 The Court reasoned that “[t]wo principal 
cases decided after Bowers cast its holding into even more doubt,”69 and 
proceeded to discuss Casey and Romer v. Evans.70 An example from the 
field of federal courts is Monell v. Department of Social Services,71 which 
overruled the holding of Monroe v. Pape that municipalities may not be 
sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.72 The Monell Court reasoned in part that 
“our cases—decided both before and after Monroe . . .—holding school 
boards liable in § 1983 actions are inconsistent with Monroe,” so that 
“it can scarcely be said that Monroe is so consistent with the warp and 
woof of civil rights law as to be beyond question.”73  
Again, when the Court invokes its own precedent, it may seem 
obvious that the Court is relying upon changes that it caused. It may 
not, however, always be so obvious. One should recall that the Court is 
a “they,” not an “it,” not just at a particular point in time, but also over 
time. It may not be apparent to all consumers of its opinions whether 
the Court is citing a previous Court or the current one.  
The Court can have an impact on the course of legislation that 
is similar to its impact on the course of judicial precedent, and it may 
subsequently take advantage of that impact without being entirely 
candid about what is going on. Perhaps the best example is Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence, where the Court expressly looks in part to 
objective indicia of “evolving standards of decency” in order to 
determine whether a national consensus rejects a particular 
punishment for a particular crime.74 For example, in holding in 
Kennedy v. Louisiana that the Constitution categorically prohibits the 
death penalty for child rape, the Court emphasized that only six states 
permitted capital punishment for that offense.75 In dissent, Justice 
Alito charged that “this statistic is a highly unreliable indicator of the 
views of state lawmakers and their constituents.”76 Dicta in the Court’s 
decision thirty years earlier in Coker v. Georgia,77 he explained,  
gave state legislators and others good reason to fear that any law permitting the 
imposition of the death penalty for this crime would meet precisely the fate that has now 
 
 68. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 69. Id. at 573–74 (discussing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)). 
 70. Id. at 574–76 (discussing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)). 
 71. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
 72. 365 U.S. 167, 191 (1961). 
 73. Monell, 436 U.S. at 696. 
 74. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion). 
 75. 554 U.S. 407, 426 (2008). 
 76. Id. at 448 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 77. 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the death penalty for 
the rape of an adult woman). 
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befallen the Louisiana statute that is currently before us, and this threat strongly 
discouraged state legislators—regardless of their own values and those of their 
constituents—from supporting the enactment of such legislation.78 
The Court is also characteristically not candid about its previous 
role in causing legal or social change when it invokes shifts in public 
opinion. The Court has a history of first affecting public opinion 
(admittedly, in complex ways79) and then later citing those effects in 
support of more controversial conclusions. One example is the Court’s 
notation in Loving of the fourteen states that had repealed their 
prohibitions on interracial marriage over the previous fifteen years.80 
That development was likely affected by the Court’s decisions leading 
up to, including, and following Brown. 
Relatedly, the Court may affect public opinion in ways that it 
later invokes in order to maintain constitutional commitments it had 
previously made. An example is the Court’s invocation in Grutter v. 
Bollinger of a widespread societal commitment to “diversity,”81 an 
ostensibly non-remedial justification for affirmative action that Justice 
Powell fashioned in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke82 at 
a time when universities were expressly defending affirmative action 
admissions programs on remedial grounds.83 Another example is the 
Court’s reaffirmation of Miranda v. Arizona84 in Dickerson v. United 
States.85 The Court there declared—in a majority opinion by Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, no previous friend of Miranda—that “Miranda has 
become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the 
warnings have become part of our national culture.”86 
Reciprocal legitimation is like the foregoing phenomena in that 
the Court invokes changes that it played a part in causing without 
 
 78. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 448 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 79. For discussion of the difficulties encountered in trying to discern the impact of Court 
decisions on public opinion, see Nathaniel Persily, Introduction to PUBLIC OPINION AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY 3, 8–14 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 2008). 
 80. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 6 n.5 (1967). 
 81. 539 U.S. 306, 328–32 (2003). 
 82. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 83. See, e.g., Robert C. Post & Neil S. Siegel, Theorizing the Law/Politics Distinction: Neutral 
Principles, Affirmative Action, and the Enduring Legacy of Paul Mishkin, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1473, 
1489 (2007) (documenting the efforts of the University of California in Bakke to justify affirmative 
action in higher education in terms of the remedial logic of past discrimination). 
 84. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 85. 530 U.S. 428 (2000). Dickerson was itself the product of an interaction between the 
Supreme Court and extrajudicial actors. See Michael C. Dorf & Barry Friedman, Shared 
Constitutional Interpretation, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 61, 61–65.  
 86. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 443. The Court has undermined Miranda in other ways. See 
generally Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (with Particular Attention to Miranda 
v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1 (2010). 
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candidly admitting as much. Reciprocal legitimation is distinct, 
however, in that it involves a particular kind of relationship that the 
Court establishes with other federal courts when it perceives threats to 
its public legitimacy, and so is less common. The next Section 
documents instances in which the Court forged—or did not forge—such 
a relationship. 
B. Public Legitimacy 
There is a second way in which the Court’s conduct in Windsor 
and Obergefell is generalizable. When the Court intervenes to decide a 
question on which American constitutional culture is deeply divided, 
the Court often takes measures to safeguard its public legitimacy.87 
Public legitimacy is distinct from legal legitimacy because each “is 
constituted by its collective acceptance” in the minds of a distinct 
audience.88 As Professor Richard Fallon has explained, “When 
legitimacy functions as a legal concept, legitimacy and illegitimacy are 
gauged by legal norms.”89 “As measured by sociological criteria,” Fallon 
continues, “the Constitution or a claim of legal authority is legitimate 
insofar as it is accepted . . . as deserving of respect or obedience—or . . . 
is otherwise acquiesced in.”90 Public legitimacy turns on whether non-
legal actors, including the general public, different regions of the 
country, and government officials, view judicial decisions as deserving 
of respect or obedience or otherwise acquiesce in them.91 
 
 87. For discussion, see generally Neil S. Siegel, The Virtue of Judicial Statesmanship, 86 TEX. 
L. REV. 959 (2008). Of course, the Court may not succeed. For example, scholars still debate the 
efficacy of the Brown Court’s actions. 
 88. See JOHN R. SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 117–18 (1995) 
(“[I]nstitutions survive on acceptance.”).  
 89. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1790 
(2005).  
 90. Id. at 1790–91; see Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 
Part Three: The Lesson of Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1383, 1387 (2001): 
[T]he work of constitutional judges must have both “legal” and “social” legitimacy. 
Social legitimacy, as distinguished from legal legitimacy, looks beyond jurisprudential 
antecedents of constitutional decisions and asks whether those decisions are widely 
understood to be the correct ones given the social and economic milieu in which they 
are rendered. 
(footnote omitted).  
 91. See, e.g., Post & Siegel, supra note 83, at 1473 (observing that the law can be apprehended 
“from the internal perspective of a faithful practitioner and from the external perspective of the 
general public,” and that “if the social legitimacy of the law as a public institution resides in the 
latter, the legal legitimacy of the law as a principled unfolding of professional reason inheres in 
the former”). 
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One way in which the Court may seek to shore up its public 
legitimacy is by participating in the process of reciprocal legitimation, 
which may initially be either intentional or unintentional. This Section 
canvasses a successful instance of intended reciprocal legitimation, a 
successful instance of unintended reciprocal legitimation, and a recent 
failure to achieve reciprocal legitimation that may or may not have 
initially been intended. 
Before beginning the case studies, it is important to note that 
whether the words of a judicial opinion have any particular empirical 
effect, such as enhancing the public legitimacy of the issuing court, 
depends upon what Professor J.L. Austin called the perlocutionary force 
of those words. Austin observed that the perlocutionary force of speech 
turns on “what we bring about or achieve by saying something, such as 
convincing, persuading, [or] deterring.”92 The perlocutionary force of a 
judicial opinion is a matter of contingent causality that depends, among 
other things, upon how exactly the court speaks. For the Court’s speech 
to affect its public legitimacy, it is not necessary to assume that the 
public carefully parses Supreme Court opinions. Rather, it is necessary 
to assume only that the content of the Court’s opinion is relevant to the 
perlocutionary effect of its speech. It is no doubt true that the meaning 
of the Court’s opinions is conveyed to the public in complex, highly 
mediated ways. 
1. The Segregation Cases 
The Brown Court sought to protect its public legitimacy in 
numerous familiar ways. It set the case for re-argument twice, and it 
expended great efforts to publicly project unanimity even though the 
Justices were divided. The Court also expressly limited the holding to 
education (as noted above), did not moralize about a moral issue, and 
allowed desegregation “with all deliberate speed.”93  
The Brown Court took those actions because it was concerned 
about the extent to which Southern politicians and citizens would 
comply with federal court orders to desegregate Southern public 
schools. The Court was less troubled by the prospect that a broader 
ruling condemning all state-mandated segregation would be 
unconvincing to legal professionals. Indeed, because purporting to limit 
 
 92. J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS 108 (2d ed. 1975).  
 93. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 682 (2d ed. 2004) (quoting Chief Justice Warren 
as explaining to his colleagues at the conference after re-argument that it would be “[u]nfortunate 
if we had to take precipitous action that would inflame more than necessary”). See generally, e.g., 
id. at 545–750 (discussing the Brown litigation when it reached the U.S. Supreme Court).  
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Brown’s rationale to education predictably subjected the Court to harsh 
criticism from legal luminaries,94 the Court was willing to sacrifice a 
portion of its legal legitimacy in order to shore up its public legitimacy. 
Reciprocal legitimation concerns threats that the Court may at times 
perceive to its public legitimacy, not its legal legitimacy. The Brown 
Court was most concerned about protecting its public legitimacy, as was 
the Windsor Court when it declined to rule more broadly—say, by 
holding that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation triggers 
heightened scrutiny.95  
Brown is an extreme case because the Court perceived that its 
public legitimacy was under extreme stress. But evidence of similar 
behavior is discernible in Windsor and Obergefell. As documented in the 
previous Part, the Court’s opinion in Windsor may have been designed 
to set in motion the process of reciprocal legitimation, and, in any event, 
that is what happened: the Court and other federal courts invoked one 
another as authority in attempting to legitimate a controversial 
decision in the face of divided public opinion. That strategy is 
potentially risky for the Court because other federal courts may decline 
the Court’s invitation. But they also may accept it, as Windsor and 
Obergefell illustrate.  
Notably, the reciprocal legitimation technique is also 
exemplified (albeit with an important twist) by Brown, the subsequent 
federal court decisions that expanded the scope of the Court’s holding 
in Brown to racial segregation in other public settings, and the Court’s 
per curiams that validated the expansion. As noted, the Court decided 
Brown in a way that self-consciously did not necessarily condemn all de 
jure racial segregation, all racial classifications, or all practices of racial 
subordination.96 During the opinion drafting process, Chief Justice 
Warren rejected a proposed addition offered by Justice Jackson because 
Warren “felt it could be interpreted as being directed toward 
segregation in general, not only in public education.”97 Warren wrote 
that the Court was limiting the rationale to education even though he 
clearly knew that the basic issue was much broader, and that the Court 
was encouraging litigants and federal judges to read it broadly. Among 
 
 94. Learned Hand and Herbert Wechsler were perhaps the two most prominent critics of 
Brown in the American legal community. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of 
Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 32 (1959) (quoting LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 
54 (1958)). 
 95. Matters are more complex for interpretive theories that render public legitimacy part of 
legal legitimacy. The account offered here assumes they are separable, at least at a given point in 
time. 
 96. See supra note 57 (quoting the Brown Court’s limitation of its holding to education). 
 97. KLUGER, supra note 93, at 701. 
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other things, Plessy v. Ferguson, whose reasoning the Court was 
rejecting, involved segregation in railroad cars.98 And almost 
immediately after Brown, the Court vacated the judgment of an 
appellate court that had upheld segregation in municipal recreational 
facilities and remanded for reconsideration in light of Brown.99 
In short order, many other federal courts leaned on the authority 
of Brown in expanding the scope of its holding to segregation in other 
public spaces in Southern life100—for example, public beaches and 
bathhouses,101 intrastate bus systems,102 and public parks and golf 
courses.103 In response, the Court leaned on those federal court 
decisions so heavily that it did not issue opinions and offer its own 
reasons. Instead, the Court simply affirmed the decisions summarily 
with citations to Brown,104 while infamously postponing consideration 
of the constitutionality of anti-miscegenation laws.105 Fearful that 
giving reasons or condemning anti-miscegenation statutes so soon after 
Brown would only make Southern resistance more massive, the Court 
waited eleven years to speak loudly in Loving.106 In the interim, the 
Court’s legitimacy became more secure,107 and so the Court developed 
 
 98. 163 U.S. 537, 538 (1896). 
 99. See Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass’n, 347 U.S. 971 (1954) (mem.) (per curiam), 
vacating and remanding 202 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1953).  
 100. Of course, federal courts also leaned on the authority of Brown in enforcing the decision. 
See generally, e.g., JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES (1981) (documenting the federal judges—
especially on the Fifth Circuit—who implemented Brown in six Southern states); KLUGER, supra 
note 93, at 749 (“[P]ractically speaking, [the Court] placed effective control of the undertaking in 
the hands of Southerners themselves—the fifty-eight federal judges manning the twenty-eight 
United States District Courts and two Courts of Appeals circuits, the Fourth and the Fifth, serving 
the South.”).  
 101. See Dawson v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore City, 220 F.2d 386, 386–87 (4th Cir. 
1955).  
 102. See Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707, 717 (M.D. Ala. 1956).  
 103. See New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass’n. v. Detiege, 252 F.2d 122, 123 (5th Cir. 
1958). 
 104. See New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass’n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (mem.) (per 
curiam), aff’g 252 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1958); Mayor & City Council of Baltimore City v. Dawson, 350 
U.S. 877 (1955) (mem.) (per curiam), aff’g 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1955); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 
903 (1956) (mem.) (per curiam), aff’g 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956); see also Holmes v. City of 
Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (mem.) (per curiam) (desegregating municipal golf courses by 
requiring the district court to enter a decree in conformity with Dawson), vacating and remanding 
223 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1955). 
 105. See Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985 (1956) (mem.) (per curiam) (dismissing for want of a 
properly presented federal question a constitutional challenge to Virginia’s ban on interracial 
marriage).  
 106. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (discussing Loving). 
 107. For discussion of the significant changes in American society between 1954 and 1967 that 
helped legitimate Brown, see AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE 
PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 214–15 (2012). 
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sufficient confidence to write per curiam opinions invalidating 
segregation in various settings.108 Exuding self-confidence in Loving, 
the Court reinterpreted Brown as having condemned racial 
classifications that reinforce inferior social status.109  
2. The Reapportionment Cases 
Another example of reciprocal legitimation, albeit one that was 
not initially intended, is the reapportionment decisions of the 1960s, 
which were decided in the shadow of massive resistance to Brown. Prior 
to the 1960s, many state legislatures were severely malapportioned, 
with districts of vastly different populations. As cities and suburbs grew 
in population, election districts were not redrawn to reflect the 
population changes. For example, fifty thousand people might elect a 
representative in one district while two hundred and fifty thousand 
people in another district elected a representative to the same 
legislature. The same malapportionment problem existed in 
congressional districts in states across the country.110 
Writing in 1946 for the Court in Colegrove v. Green, Justice 
Frankfurter admonished that “[c]ourts ought not to enter this political 
thicket” of legislative reapportionment, lest the public legitimacy of the 
court be imperiled.111 By 1961, his position had not changed, and he 
attempted to sway Justice Stewart to his side while Baker v. Carr112 
was pending before the Court. He wrote to Justice Stewart that judicial 
 
 108. See, e.g., Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S 61, 62 (1963) (per curiam) (“[I]t is no longer open 
to question that a State may not constitutionally require segregation of public facilities. State-
compelled segregation in a court of justice is a manifest violation of the State’s duty to deny no one 
the equal protection of its laws.” (citations to Brown and subsequent decisions omitted)); Turner 
v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350, 352–53 (1962) (per curiam) (holding that statutes and regulation 
articulating state policy promoting racial segregation in public restaurants violates the Fourteenth 
Amendment).  
 109. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (“The fact that Virginia prohibits only 
interracial marriages involving white persons demonstrates that the racial classifications must 
stand on their own justification, as measures designed to maintain White Supremacy.”); see also 
Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional 
Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1478–80 (2004) (demonstrating that the 
anticlassification and antisubordination principles were understood to be closely connected in the 
years before and after Brown). Loving reflects the ambiguity present in Brown and Bolling 
regarding what sort of mediating principle of equality the Court was enforcing. On that question, 
as opposed to the geographic scope of the no-segregation principle, the Brown Court was unlikely 
to have been intending reciprocal legitimation because the Court, like the broader legal 
community, was unable to clearly discern that potentially competing principles were at stake until 
subsequent disputes arose over disparate impact and affirmative action. 
 110. For a recent discussion of this history by the Court, see Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 
1123–24 (2016).  
 111. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).  
 112. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).  
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intervention threatened to “bring the Court in conflict with political 
forces and exacerbate political feelings widely throughout the Nation on 
a larger scale, though not so pathologically, as the Segregation cases 
have stirred.”113 Justice Frankfurter would later write in dissent in 
Baker that “[t]he Court’s authority—possessed of neither the purse nor 
the sword—ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its moral 
sanction.”114 “Such feeling,” he continued, “must be nourished by the 
Court’s complete detachment, in fact and in appearance, from political 
entanglements and by abstention from injecting itself into the clash of 
political forces in political settlements.”115 
Justice Frankfurter failed to persuade Justice Stewart, and the 
Court forged ahead over Justice Frankfurter’s objections, 
notwithstanding reasonable concerns that state legislatures or 
Congress might not comply with federal court orders to reapportion.116 
In responding to reapportionment cases, the Court proceeded in stages. 
First, it held in Baker v. Carr only that reapportionment challenges 
were justiciable, leaving it to other courts to initially decide whether to 
insist upon population equality, something close to equality with 
permissible deviations for sufficient cause, mere rationality, or some 
other standard.117 In rejecting the applicability of the political question 
doctrine, Justice Brennan wrote in part for the majority that “[j]udicial 
standards under the Equal Protection Clause are well developed and 
familiar, and it has been open to courts since the enactment of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to determine, if on the particular facts they 
must, that a discrimination reflects no policy, but simply arbitrary and 
capricious action.”118 The Solicitor General and counsel for the plaintiffs 
 
 113. J. DOUGLAS SMITH, ON DEMOCRACY’S DOORSTEP: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW THE 
SUPREME COURT BROUGHT “ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE” TO THE UNITED STATES 80 (2014); see id. at 
83 (noting that, at the second argument in Baker, Justice Frankfurter warned that judicial 
intervention in segregation cases would prove “simpler” than intervention in reapportionment 
would be, and that he rhetorically asked Solicitor General Archibald Cox whether he thought “the 
prejudices on this business of urban versus rural, which is just as strong in New York as it is in 
Tennessee, isn’t even more deep-seated and more pervasively deep-seated”). 
 114. Baker, 369 U.S. at 267 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).  
 115. Id.  
 116. For descriptions of the fraught political context in which the Court operated, see Guy-
Uriel E. Charles, Constitutional Pluralism and Democratic Politics: Reflections on the Interpretive 
Approach of Baker v. Carr, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1103, 1115–22 (2002); Mark V. Tushnet, Law and 
Prudence in the Law of Justiciability: The Transformation and Disappearance of the Political 
Question Doctrine, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1203, 1231–32 (2002).  
 117. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 237. 
 118. Id. at 226. 
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had urged the Court to adopt a deferential approach.119 At that point, 
however, the Court was deciding only the question of justiciability. 
Although “[s]ome commentators criticized the Court for laying 
down no more specific guidelines for lower courts to follow,” Professor 
Gordon Baker, writing in 1966, opined that the Court’s forbearance 
“may have been a calculated and perceptive move.”120 “By letting state 
and lower Federal courts tackle the specific problems in particular 
states,” Baker explained, “the supreme tribunal would be able to gauge 
the reactions—both political and judicial—before moving farther.”121 He 
added that the Court “must have been impressed with the ensuing flood 
of litigation,” as well as with “the alacrity with which many lower court 
judges moved to correct alleged malapportionments.”122 Political 
scientist Martin Shapiro was less pleased with the Court, opining that 
it “has, in a sense, not kept its word to those of its defenders who have 
relied on the initially limited arguments” and that “[i]t remains to be 
seen whether or not the tactical advantage gained by its ‘delayed action’ 
approach will compensate for the Court’s loss of that precious political 
asset, a reputation for candor.”123 
Judging from the inside account of the Court’s deliberations 
recently offered by Professor J. Gordon Smith, however, the reason the 
Court decided only the issue of justiciability in Baker appears to have 
had much to do with unstable internal Court dynamics.124 Justice 
Brennan initially needed Justice Stewart’s vote in order to secure a 
majority, and Justice Stewart did not want to decide more than the 
issue of justiciability. Whatever the reasons for Justice Stewart’s 
minimalism (among other possibilities, perhaps Justice Frankfurter’s 
lobbying took a toll), Justice Brennan no longer required Justice 
Stewart’s vote when Justice Clark changed his mind after 
unsuccessfully attempting to write a dissent. What is more, Justice 
Clark expressed willingness to decide not only the issue of justiciability, 
but also the merits. After talking with Chief Justice Warren, however, 
Justice Brennan decided not to redraft the majority opinion so late in 
the term. Perhaps Justice Brennan did not push for a broader ruling at 
 
 119. See Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Reynolds Reconsidered, 67 ALA. L. 
REV. 485, 503 (2015) (explaining the litigation positions of the parties and the Court’s response).  
 120. GORDON E. BAKER, THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION: REPRESENTATION, POLITICAL 
POWER, AND THE SUPREME COURT 123–24 (1966). 
 121. Id. at 124. 
 122. Id. 
 123. MARTIN SHAPIRO, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE SUPREME COURT: NEW APPROACHES TO 
POLITICAL JURISPRUDENCE 250–52 (1964). Shapiro was criticizing both Brown and Baker. 
 124. This paragraph draws from SMITH, supra note 113, at 86–89. For a similar account, see 
BERNARD SCHWARTZ & STEPHAN LESHER, INSIDE THE WARREN COURT 1953-1969, at 183–98 (1983). 
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least in part because he perceived strategic advantage in delay—
whether because he had intended reciprocal legitimation in mind, or 
because he did not want to alienate Justice Stewart. It also seems likely, 
however, that the Court would have issued a broader ruling had Justice 
Clark initially joined the majority. Moreover, there were not yet five 
votes for “one person, one vote,”125 so the Court could not then have been 
proceeding with that ultimate objective in mind.  
Whatever the best explanation for the limited nature of the 
Court’s intervention in Baker, the “short-term response” to it was 
“nothing short of astonishing.”126 Writing in 1962, Professor Robert 
McCloskey observed that “[n]ot only federal judges, but state judges as 
well, have taken the inch or so of encouragement offered by the 
Supreme Court and stretched it out to a mile,” for “[l]egislatures all over 
the country have been bidden to redistrict or to face the prospect of 
having the judiciary do the job for them.”127 In all, there were “more 
than seventy legislative and congressional reapportionment lawsuits 
filed in forty states in the aftermath of Baker v. Carr.”128 Baker set in 
motion a process, the next phase of which entailed federal and state 
judges leaning on its authority in moving toward population equality.  
The final phase began when those decisions returned to the 
Court. Over the next few years, the Court decided the merits of various 
apportionment scenarios, roughly in order from least controversial to 
most controversial. In Gray v. Sanders,129 the Court invalidated 
Georgia’s primary election law and county unit system.130 Writing for 
the Court, Justice Douglas declared that “[t]he conception of political 
equality from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln’s Gettysburg 
Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments 
can mean only one thing—one person, one vote.”131 In Wesberry v. 
 
 125. SMITH, supra note 113, at 216 (“Five votes for the more sweeping standard did not exist 
prior to the confirmation of Byron White and Arthur Goldberg.”); id. (“As late as 1962, almost no 
one involved in reapportionment litigation even contemplated population equality in both houses 
of a bicameral legislature.”). 
 126. Robert G. McCloskey, The Supreme Court, 1961 Term—Foreword: The Reapportionment 
Cases, 76 HARV. L. REV. 54, 56 (1962). This piece contains a long footnote, see id. at 56–58 n.14, 
that reports on then-pending litigation and legislative action in the wake of Baker. 
 127. Id. at 57–58. 
 128. SMITH, supra note 113, at 139.  
 129. 372 U.S. 368 (1963).  
 130. Georgia’s law “technically governed the running of primaries for statewide offices such as 
governor, lieutenant governor, and U.S. senator. But in practice it ensured that a rural minority 
maintained almost absolute control of the urbanizing state.” SMITH, supra note 113, at 103–04.  
 131. Gray, 372 U.S. at 381; see id. at 382 (Harlan, J., dissenting): 
When [Baker] was argued at the last Term we were assured that if this Court would 
only remove the roadblocks of [Colegrove] and its predecessors to judicial review in 
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Sanders, the Court turned its attention to the House of 
Representatives,132 agreeing with the dissenter on the three-judge 
district court, who had “relied on Baker v. Carr.”133 In a majority opinion 
written by Justice Black, the Court held that “as nearly as is practicable 
one man’s vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as 
another’s.”134  
More controversially, in Reynolds v. Sims, the Court expanded 
the scope of the principle of population equality to state legislative 
districts.135 The Court held that, “as a basic constitutional standard, the 
Equal Protection Clause requires that the seats in both houses of a 
bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on a population 
basis.”136 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Warren observed that 
“[t]he spate of similar cases filed and decided by lower courts since our 
decision in Baker amply shows that the problem of state legislative 
malapportionment is one that is perceived to exist in a large number of 
the States.”137 The Court added in a footnote that “[l]itigation 
challenging the constitutionality of state legislative apportionment 
schemes had been instituted in at least 34 States prior to the end of 
1962—within nine months of our decision in Baker v. Carr.”138  
The Court in Reynolds v. Sims did not expressly cite numerous 
federal and state court decisions as authority for its own resolution, as 
it did in Obergefell. As just noted, however, the Court did lean on federal 
and state court decisions in documenting the scope of the “problem . . . 
that is perceived to exist.” The Court did not acknowledge that Baker 
likely played a role in producing that perception, even as the Court 
observed that those decisions were rendered after Baker. As Professor 
Gordon Baker reported, moreover, “the ‘consensus of lower courts’ in 
 
“electoral” cases, this Court in all likelihood would never have to get deeper into such 
matters. State legislatures, it was predicted, would be prodded into taking satisfactory 
action by the mere prospect of legal proceedings. These predictions have not proved 
true. 
 132. The constitutional text defeated application of the principle of “one person, one vote” to 
the U.S. Senate. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3. For a discussion, see Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, 
Constructed Constraint and the Constitutional Text, 64 DUKE L.J. 1213, 1283–85 (2015). 
 133. 376 U.S. 1, 4 (1964).  
 134. Id. at 7–8.  
 135. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).  
 136. Id. at 568; see also Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713, 734–37 
(1964) (requiring population equality in the apportionment of districts in both houses of a 
bicameral legislature, regardless of whether a majority of the state electorate approves an 
apportionment scheme that deviates from population equality in one house). 
 137. Sims, 377 U.S. at 556.  
 138. Id. at 556 n.30 (citing, inter alia, Robert B. McKay, Political Thickets and Crazy Quilts: 
Reapportionment and Equal Protection, 61 MICH. L. REV. 645, 706–10 (1963), and emphasizing 
that it “contains an appendix summarizing reapportionment litigation through the end of 1962”).  
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moving toward representative equality” was a major theme of oral 
arguments in reapportionment cases that term.139 Thus, the 
reapportionment cases appear to be another instance in which the 
Court intervened in stages and interacted dialectically, not simply 
hierarchically, with other federal (and state) courts.  
In another way, the majority opinion in Reynolds v. Sims quietly 
sought to ameliorate threats to the Court’s public legitimacy. Chief 
Justice Warren offered the reassurance that controversies over 
reapportionment did not simply involve “urban-rural conflicts,” 
notwithstanding how they “are generally viewed.” This was because 
“fast-growing suburban areas . . . are probably the most seriously 
underrepresented in many of our state legislatures,” and because 
“[m]alapportionment can, and has historically, run in various 
directions.”140 Those observations were irrelevant to the constitutional 
question, as Warren acknowledged.141 But he included them anyway.142 
3. A Failure of Reciprocal Legitimation:  
The Second Amendment Cases 
The Court’s Second Amendment jurisprudence is an area in 
which, at least so far, reciprocal legitimation has failed to 
materialize.143 In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Court held that the 
Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess a firearm, 
including a handgun, in the home for purposes of self-defense.144 Two 
years later, in McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Court held that the 
right declared in Heller satisfies the requirements for incorporation and 
so applies to the states.145  
In the wake of those decisions, federal district and circuit courts 
have almost always rejected Second Amendment claims. “Regardless of 
the level of scrutiny that has been applied,” the Law Center to Prevent 
Gun Violence reports, “nearly all of these [post-Heller] cases have one 
 
 139. BAKER, supra note 120, at 125. 
 140. Sims, 377 U.S. at 567 n.43.  
 141. See id.  
 142. Reynolds v. Sims generated a political firestorm that included various threatened 
responses, including a proposed constitutional amendment that would have partially reversed the 
result. The proposal fell just short of passage by the Senate in 1965, and all other efforts to reverse 
the decision “failed and failed quickly.” HOWARD GILLMAN, MARK A. GRABER, & KEITH E. 
WHITTINGTON, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: VOLUME II: RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 569 (2013).  
 143. Another such example is United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). For a discussion, 
see generally Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, Lower Court Readings of Lopez, or What 
if the Supreme Court Held a Constitutional Revolution and Nobody Came, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 369.  
 144. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 145. 561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
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thing in common: the Second Amendment challenge has been rejected 
and the statute at issue has been upheld.”146 “Of the more than 900 
cases tracked by the Law Center,” this source continues, “96% have 
rejected the Second Amendment Challenge.”147 Based in part on the 
data, Professor Richard Re describes Heller as having “been narrowed 
from below.”148  
It is not clear, however, what the Court in Heller and McDonald 
was intending to accomplish. It is possible that the story to date of those 
decisions is one in which the federal courts have largely rejected the 
Supreme Court’s invitation to expand the scope of Second Amendment 
rights. As an initial matter, the Court may have had judicial legitimacy 
on its “mind.” Although in 2008 there was significant public support for 
some form of Second Amendment right,149 the Court was significantly 
changing constitutional law when it declared for the first time in 
American history that the Second Amendment protects an individual 
right of firearm possession in the home for self-defense purposes. The 
consequences of such a declaration for the prevention of crime, mass 
killings, accidents, and suicides were far from certain. 
It is also possible that the Court was attempting to move the 
federal courts in the direction of a relatively robust understanding of 
Second Amendment rights without yet requiring them to enforce such 
an understanding. Writing for the majority in Heller, Justice Scalia 
emphasized, for example, that “whatever else [the Second Amendment] 
leaves to future evaluation, it surely elevates above all other interests 
the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of 
hearth and home.”150 He also declared it “not debatable” that “it is not 
the role of this Court to pronounce the Second Amendment extinct.”151 
Those statements may have been intended to encourage the federal 
courts in an opinion that was self-conscious not to “clarify the entire 
field”152 or “undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the full 
 
 146. Post-Heller Litigation Summary, LAW CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE 6 (Mar. 31, 2015), 
http://smartgunlaws.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Post-Heller-Litigation-Summary-March-
2015-Final-Version.pdf [https://perma.cc/R5K8-TN7B].  
 147. Id.  
 148. Re, supra note 13, at 961–63.  
 149. According to a USA Today/Gallup Poll conducted in February 2008, “A solid majority of 
the U.S. public, 73%, believes the Second Amendment to the Constitution guarantees the rights of 
Americans to own guns. Twenty percent believe the amendment only guarantees the rights of state 
militia members to own guns.” Jeffrey M. Jones, Public Believes Americans Have Right to Own 
Guns, GALLUP (Mar. 27, 2008), http://www.gallup.com/poll/105721/Public-Believes-Americans-
Right-Own-Guns.aspx [https://perma.cc/LF53-P8DB]. 
 150. 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008). 
 151. Id. at 636. 
 152. Id. at 635. 
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scope of the Second Amendment.”153 Most significantly, the Court did 
not announce a level of scrutiny or indicate whether the right to possess 
a firearm for purposes of self-defense extends outside the home. Those 
questions, and others, were left to federal district and circuit courts, as 
well as state courts. 
The Court also included qualifications in its opinion that can 
perhaps be understood to reflect the fact that the Court was only 
attempting to persuade other federal courts for the time being instead 
of coercing them. The Court stated that  
nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the 
possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of 
firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing 
conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.154  
The Court also “recognize[d] another important limitation on the right 
to keep and carry arms”—namely, that “the sorts of weapons protected 
were those ‘in common use at the time,’ ” a limitation that the Court 
thought was “fairly supported by the historical tradition of prohibiting 
the carrying of ‘dangerous and unusual weapons.’ ”155  
An alternative interpretation of the foregoing evidence, 
however, is that Heller and McDonald were compromises among the 
Justices in the majority and that the qualifications Justice Scalia 
included were the price of a fifth vote (and perhaps a fourth as well). 
Notably, Heller, like United States v. Lopez,156 was a case in which the 
lower courts moved the law first and forced the Court’s hand.157 There 
apparently were, and continue to be, significant disagreements among 
the members of the Heller majority. In recent years, fractures within 
that majority have been aired publicly with increasing frequency. 
Recently, the Court held narrowly (and without briefing or argument) 
that the explanation offered by the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts in upholding a state law prohibiting the possession of 
stun guns contradicted Heller and McDonald. The Court merely 
vacated the judgment of the state court and remanded for further 
 
 153. Id. at 626. 
 154. Id. at 626–27. 
 155. Id. at 627 (citations omitted). 
 156. See supra note 143 (noting that Lopez is another instance in which lower federal courts 
have declined to expand the scope of the Court’s decision).  
 157. See United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1367–68 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that federal 
statute banning gun possession on school grounds was beyond the scope of the Commerce Clause); 
Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 401 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding that the District of 
Columbia’s restrictions on firearms violated the Second Amendment).  
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proceedings.158 By contrast, Justice Alito, in an opinion joined by Justice 
Thomas, concurred only in the judgment, criticizing “[t]his Court’s 
grudging per curiam,” which “now sends the case back to that same 
court.”159 The Court had not previously granted certiorari in a Second 
Amendment case in the wake of Heller and McDonald, and it sometimes 
denied certiorari over public dissents.160  
One lesson of Heller and McDonald is that there will be 
situations in which one cannot know, at least not yet, how best to 
understand majority opinions that seemingly point in different 
directions in circumstances in which the Court may be concerned about 
its public legitimacy. As Professor Martin Shapiro’s misinterpretation 
of Baker suggests,161 such situations are most likely to arise when the 
decisions are recent and so internal evidence of the Court’s 
deliberations is unavailable. It seems unlikely, however, that one will 
always be in that situation. There is persuasive evidence, discussed 
above, indicating what the Brown Court was attempting to accomplish. 
And although a cautionary tale of this Part is that one cannot be equally 
confident about judicial motivations regarding recent events, there has 
been no indication to date (even as it remains possible) that the majority 
in Windsor was internally divided in a way suggesting that the decision 
was a compromise, as opposed to an invitation. Unlike the situation in 
Baker, moreover, it seems improbable that there were vote switches 
while Windsor was pending before the Court.  
4. Falsification 
The foregoing case studies involve different categories of 
reciprocal legitimation or else its absence. They also implicate a variety 
of potential kinds of evidence of intended or unintended reciprocal 
legitimation, including the level of public controversy over an issue, the 
sequencing of judicial opinions by different courts, a close textual 
 
 158. Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027, 1028 (2016) (per curiam). According to the per 
curiam opinion, even though the Court in Heller had held that the Second Amendment right 
extends to arms that did not exist at the time of the Founding and to arms that are not useful in 
warfare, the state court held that stun guns are outside the scope of the Second Amendment right 
because they were not in common use when the amendment was ratified and because they are not 
adaptable for use in the military. See id.  
 159. Id. at 1033 (Alito, J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).  
 160. See, e.g., Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 
136 S. Ct. 447, 447 (2015) (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) 
(“Despite these holdings [in Heller and McDonald], several Courts of Appeals—including the Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in the decision below—have upheld categorical bans on firearms 
that millions of Americans commonly own for lawful purposes.”).  
 161. See supra text accompanying note 123 (quoting Shapiro). 
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analysis of the reasoning and citations in those opinions, and (where 
available) the Court’s internal deliberations. Finally, the case studies 
involve differences in the potential threats to the Court’s public 
legitimacy, including dangers emanating from the general public, the 
populations of particular regions of the country, and government 
officials. What binds the examples together and makes them at least 
potential candidates for reciprocal legitimation is the particular three-
stage sequencing of judicial decisions by different courts in a judicial 
hierarchy in circumstances in which the public legitimacy of those 
courts may be perceived by the judges to be in question. Specifically, the 
Supreme Court in the initial stage decides less than it is authorized to 
decide while potentially signaling to the lower courts that they should 
expand the scope of the Court’s holding at the second stage. If lower 
courts do so and invoke the Court’s initial decision as authority, and if 
the Court validates the expansion and invokes those lower court 
decisions as authority, then it seems likely, although not certain, that 
reciprocal legitimation has taken place.  
As noted at the end of Part I, it can no doubt be difficult to falsify 
such a conclusion. But it is not in principle impossible. For example, 
judges may speak in an extrajudicial capacity about what they were 
intending to accomplish or avoid, and their internal deliberations may 
eventually become available. In addition, alternative explanations for 
why a judicial opinion is written in a certain way may be viewed as more 
or less persuasive. And good empiricists may fashion creative ways of 
testing the causal relationships—between the initial Supreme Court 
decision and lower court decisions, and then between those lower court 
decisions and the ultimate Supreme Court decision—that are part of a 
claim of reciprocal legitimation. In any event, a theoretical account of 
occasional judicial behavior can be informative even if it is difficult to 
falsify. Such an account can be useful when the evidence for it is at least 
suggestive and it is among the best accounts of an observable practice 
that are currently available, even if one cannot be certain about its 
accuracy. 
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE ACCOUNT AND EXTENSIONS OF THE MODEL 
This Part identifies two implications of the account of reciprocal 
legitimation offered in this Article for scholarship about the federal 
courts in law and political science. The first implication concerns the 
processes of constitutional change, which include a greater role for the 
agency of judges than is recognized in several prominent accounts in 
the literature. The second implication concerns the nature of the 
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relationship between the Supreme Court and other federal courts, 
which at certain times is more dialectical and less top-down or bottom-
up than is commonly supposed. 
This Part also identifies extensions of the model of judicial 
interactions proposed here. The model can be expanded to include state 
courts and non-judicial actors. It can also be extended to include certain 
judicial phenomena that can blend into reciprocal legitimation—
specifically, experimentation and learning.  
A. The (Judicial) Processes of Constitutional Change 
Prominent theorists of constitutional change disagree about how 
such change takes place. According to Professor Bruce Ackerman, 
constitutional change occurs rarely and over relatively short periods of 
time. Ackerman has developed a descriptive and normative theory of 
“constitutional moments,” according to which Americans live in a 
“dualist democracy.” During pivotal periods in American history, 
Ackerman argues, ordinary politics is displaced by a constitutional 
politics in which a movement party in control of one branch of the 
national government defeats opposition expressed by another branch 
and succeeds in persuading the American people to amend the 
Constitution outside the Article V process of formal amendment. 
Whereas the Republican Congress was in command during 
Reconstruction (and it subdued President Andrew Johnson and the 
Supreme Court), President Franklin Delano Roosevelt led 
constitutional change during the New Deal (and he eventually defeated 
the Court).162  
By contrast, other theorists understand constitutional change as 
occurring relatively frequently and incrementally over potentially 
longer periods of time. For example, Professors Jack Balkin and 
Sanford Levinson have articulated a descriptive theory of “partisan 
entrenchment” to explain routine, gradual changes in constitutional 
law that they believe are characteristic of how the American 
constitutional system functions. According to their theory, the 
president’s power to nominate Justices and other federal judges means 
that the party controlling the White House can, if it chooses, appoint 
federal judges with roughly similar ideological orientations on issues of 
greatest significance to the party (subject to a potential check from the 
 
 162. For Ackerman’s comprehensive work on this theory, see 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE 
PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991) [hereinafter ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS]; 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE 
THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998), and 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL 
RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2014). 
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Senate). Over time, that process can produce substantial changes in 
constitutional law.163 
Because those two theories differ over the primary mechanism 
and pace of constitutional change, they also differ in the extent to which 
they regard constitutional change as democratic. Ackerman views 
constitutional moments as embodying democratic self-governance 
because they involve focused efforts by the American people to refashion 
the meaning of important parts of the Constitution. For Balkin and 
Levinson, by contrast, constitutional change is only roughly democratic 
because it tends to unfold over an extended period of time, and there is 
typically a lag between when the governing party decides what it wants 
to accomplish and when the federal courts respond. The two theories 
also have different objectives. Whereas Ackerman is concerned to 
establish both how constitutional change occurs and when it is 
legitimate, Balkin and Levinson purport only to describe how it 
happens.  
For all of those differences between the theories, they share an 
important similarity. For both, it is political actors, not legal actors, who 
primarily drive constitutional change. That is especially true of 
Ackerman. His focus is on presidents, Congresses, and their associated 
social movements, which either tame each other or the Court. He is 
explicit that he is not interested in “judges talking to one another about 
the relationship of past decisions to present problems.”164 Indeed, 
because Ackerman is a kind of originalist (with more, and more recent, 
Foundings to account for than most originalists), his judges play a 
preservationist and synthetic role; neither his descriptive nor his 
normative story acknowledges the phenomenon of judicial politics or 
imagines that judges can play a leading role in constitutional 
development.165  
Federal judges play substantially more of a role in producing 
constitutional change in Balkin and Levinson’s theory of partisan 
entrenchment: judges are the ones who are entrenched by partisans in 
the White House and, potentially, the Senate. For Balkin and Levinson 
as well, however, political actors are the primary drivers of 
constitutional change. Balkin and Levinson emphasize the role of the 
 
 163. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. 
L. REV. 1045, 1067 (2001). 
 164. ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 162, at 20. 
 165. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: THE 
PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 48 (2007) 
(“The possibility of judicial politics or the judiciary as an active agent of constitutional development 
creates severe problems for his normative and historical narrative, and Ackerman takes pains to 
marginalize it.”). 
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governing political coalition, whose bidding judges may eventually do. 
For them, in other words, judges are agents, not principals. 
Like Balkin and Levinson, Professor Barry Friedman offers a 
positive theory, not a normative one. Also like them, he focuses on the 
agency of forces outside the judiciary in shaping constitutional law. 
Specifically, Friedman argues—in line with a large literature,166 but 
more exhaustively—that the Supreme Court follows public opinion, at 
least in general, over the long run, and on salient issues.167 Similar to 
Balkin and Levinson’s theory, each of those qualifications leaves some 
room for the Court’s own agency.168 Friedman’s basic point, however, is 
that the Court is acted upon far more frequently than it acts. 
Professors Robert Post and Reva Siegel situate courts in a more 
active role. They have developed their theory of “democratic 
constitutionalism” to explain and “express the paradox that 
constitutional authority depends on both its democratic responsiveness 
and its legitimacy as law.”169 “Americans,” they write, “want their 
Constitution to have the authority of law, and they understand law to 
be distinct from politics.”170 Moreover, “they understand that the rule of 
law is rooted in professional practices,” including those of judges, “that 
are distinct from popular politics.”171 Even so, Post and Siegel stress—
and this is their main point—that if the public comes to view the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Constitution as wholly 
unresponsive to popular commitments, then “the American people will 
in time come to regard it as illegitimate and oppressive, and they will 
act to repudiate it as they did during the New Deal.”172 Post and Siegel, 
 
 166. The seminal work is Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme 
Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957). More recent examples include THOMAS 
R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE SUPREME COURT (1989), and THOMAS R. MARSHALL, 
PUBLIC OPINION AND THE REHNQUIST COURT (2008). 
 167. BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE 
SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009). 
 168. See Neil S. Siegel, A Coase Theorem for Constitutional Theory, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 
583, 595 (“All of Friedman’s qualifications are well conceived, but each pays tribute to the very 
[counter-majoritarian] difficulty he means to deny.”). 
 169. Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Democratic Constitutionalism, in THE CONSTITUTION IN 
2020, at 25, 27 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009) (emphases omitted) [hereinafter Post 
& Siegel, Democratic Constitutionalism]. For a more elaborate development of their theory, see 
generally Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373 (2007).  
 170. Post & Siegel, Democratic Constitutionalism, supra note 169, at 27. 
 171. Id. at 27–28. 
 172. Id. at 28; see also id. at 25–26 (writing that “important aspects of American constitutional 
law evolve in response to substantive constitutional visions that the American people have 
mobilized to realize,” and that “these responsive features of the law help sustain the Constitution’s 
authority in history”). 
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like Balkin in his more recent work on living originalism,173 seek to 
provide an account that encompasses the influence of both judicial and 
non-judicial actors on the fashioning of constitutional law. Their 
emphasis, however, is more on the responsiveness of constitutional 
judges to democratic forces than it is on the capacity of such judges to 
shape constitutional politics. 
There is a sense in which all of these theories are obviously 
correct to focus on extrajudicial actors. Throughout American history, 
changes in political commitments have led to changes in constitutional 
law in various ways. First, Article V amendments are rare but have 
sometimes proven possible. Second, electoral politics results in acts of 
constitutional interpretation and institution building by the political 
branches, as well as the appointment of judges, as Balkin and Levinson 
explain. Third, segments of the public may engage in efforts to change 
social norms, whether through social movement advocacy, litigation, or 
both. Fourth, norm contestation may also occur through the rhetoric of 
presidents and other influential politicians. “To succeed in changing 
social norms,” Balkin has more recently observed, “may be as powerful 
as changing judges and politicians, for it alters the underlying sense of 
what is reasonable and unreasonable for governments to do. It shifts 
political and professional discourse about what is off-the-wall and on-
the-wall in making claims on the Constitution.”174 For example, during 
the period extending from Windsor to Obergefell, the Supreme Court 
and other federal courts were deciding same-sex marriage cases in a 
context in which public opinion was moving—with remarkable 
dispatch—in the same direction as almost all of those courts. In that 
respect, Obergefell is not a counter-majoritarian decision. 
Even so, the Court did not simply validate a national consensus 
by bringing outliers into line.175 Throughout the relevant period, 
American culture remained regionally divided over the legitimacy of 
same-sex marriage. Indeed, public opinion remains divided today.176 
Accordingly, Obergefell was an anti-federalist decision: if not for the 
 
 173. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 70–72 & 360 n.8 (2011) (embracing democratic 
constitutionalism not only as an accurate descriptive account, as Post & Siegel do, but also as a 
normative account of why the constitutional system possesses democratic legitimacy).  
 174. Id. at 71.  
 175. For a discussion of constitutional outliers and guidelines for proper use of the term, see 
Justin Driver, Constitutional Outliers, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 929 (2014). 
 176. In a Gallup poll conducted May 4–8, 2016, thirty-seven percent of respondents expressed 
the view that same-sex marriage should not be recognized by the law as valid, sixty-one percent 
expressed the opposite view, and two percent had no opinion. Marriage, GALLUP, 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/117328/Marriage.aspx (last visited Feb. 25, 2017) [https://perma.cc/ 
66JJ-P8J4]. 
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intervention of the federal courts, most states would likely prohibit 
same-sex marriage today. Given that reality, it is insufficient to look 
nearly exclusively at political actors, social movements, or public 
opinion in explaining how constitutional change occurred.  
According to the account offered in this Article, legal elites—
judges—played a prominent role in bringing about and legitimating 
constitutional change. They neither enforced the Constitution as 
amended in the most recent constitutional moment, nor vindicated the 
constitutional commitments of the governing political coalition that 
installed certain judges and Justices in the late 1980s and early 
1990s.177 Indeed, contrary to the partisan entrenchment thesis, the 
Appendix to this Article documents that Republican appointees in the 
Second, Fourth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits voted to invalidate federal 
or state restrictions on same-sex marriage. Only the voting by panel 
members on the Sixth and Ninth Circuits conformed to partisanship-
based predictions without exception.  
Nor did judges who voted to invalidate prohibitions on same-sex 
marriage simply follow public opinion or deeply felt popular 
commitments. Although those judges did respond to significant, more 
recent changes in cultural values, they also likely played a role in 
causing those changes. And they did so in part by working together and 
orchestrating events behind the scenes—by leaning on one another for 
support as they intervened in the conflict over same-sex marriage.178 
Justices drew support from other federal judges who in turn had drawn 
support from them, all the while normalizing in the public 
consciousness the idea that same-sex marriage is constitutionally 
protected through media reports of repeated (indeed, seemingly daily) 
judicial invalidations. Theories of constitutional change are incomplete 
to the extent that they, like many other participants and observers, do 
not recognize the fascinating interaction between the Supreme Court 
and other federal courts that recently took place. 
 
 177. Ackerman’s theory does not seem able to capture the forces that produced Obergefell. 
Balkin and Levinson’s theory can account for the role of the Sotomayor and Kagan confirmations, 
and those of recently appointed federal judges who voted to invalidate state bans on same-sex 
marriage. 
 178. Cf. Douglas NeJaime, The Legal Mobilization Dilemma, 61 EMORY L.J. 663, 731 (2012) 
(“[C]onstitutional change and political and social mobilizations are so intertwined that, in 
interpreting and applying legal doctrine, judges are influenced by—and, in turn, influence—
notions about constitutional meaning that originate outside the courts.”).  
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B. The Federal Courts System 
Much scholarship in law and political science has long studied 
the Supreme Court without regard for its relationship to other courts, 
or else has understood the Court and other federal courts to relate 
hierarchically.179 A famous example of a scholar who studied the Court 
in relative isolation is Alexander Bickel, who had only the Court in mind 
when he advocated that it deploy the “passive virtues,” such as creative 
application of standing doctrine, in order to protect legal principles from 
being warped by the need to maintain the public legitimacy of the 
Court.180 At the end of a long chapter in the same book that coined the 
phrase “the countermajoritarian difficulty” (thereby helping spawn a 
cottage industry in constitutional theory for the next half century), 
Bickel noted that “I have not addressed myself, in this chapter or 
elsewhere, to the role of the lower federal courts, of which the Supreme 
Court is the hierarchical head.”181 For Bickel, the relevant 
“conversation” was “between the Court and the people and their 
representatives,”182 not between different courts. 
To the extent that Bickel considered the relationship between 
the Court and other federal courts, he conceived of the Court as the 
principal—“the hierarchical head” in the quotation above—and other 
federal courts as its faithful agents. “Some of the methods and devices 
I have discussed are obviously not open to use in the lower courts,” he 
observed, adding that “[s]ome are, and as to them, the system of 
precedent, by which the Supreme Court instructs the lower courts and 
employs them as its agents, will serve.”183 Along similar lines, political 
scientist Henry Abraham wrote that the Court “stands at the very 
pinnacle of the judiciary: There is no higher court, and all others bow 
before it—or, at least, are expected to do so.”184 Closer to the present, 
Professor Katie Eyer writes that, “as others have observed, the lower 
federal courts are, in our system, bounded by a constitutional culture 
 
 179. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REV. 257, 295 (2005):  
In the legal academy, thinking about the judicial system is distinctly top-down. There 
is a hierarchy, and at the pinnacle sits the Supreme Court. The work of the Supreme 
Court gets the lion’s share of attention, and it is simply taken for granted that lower 
courts do, and should, follow the mandate of higher courts.  
(footnote omitted). 
 180. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE 
BAR OF POLITICS 111–98 (1962). 
 181. Id. at 16, 198. 
 182. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 91 (1970). 
 183. BICKEL, supra note 180, at 198.  
 184. HENRY J. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 186 (7th ed. 1998). 
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that regards them primarily as the faithful agents of the Supreme 
Court’s constitutional perspective.”185  
Because such scholarship in law and political science models the 
relationship between the Court and other federal courts hierarchically, 
it understands the “apex” and “inferior” courts to perform different 
functions and to engage in characteristically different forms of 
reasoning. Some legal scholars who write in this vein, like Judge 
Richard Posner, purport to be realistically assessing the differences 
between the Supreme Court and other federal courts.186 In Posner’s 
view, whereas the Court is a “political body,” a “lawless judicial 
institution” in the sense that it possesses “an ocean of discretion,”187 
other federal courts are bound by Supreme Court precedent and so are 
better able to exhibit “a certain respect for the conventional materials 
of decision.”188 Similarly, Professor Thomas Merrill writes that the 
Court “frequently supplements consideration of precedent with other 
types of authority, such as social policy, precedent from other legal 
systems, and occasionally even original understanding.”189 By contrast, 
Merrill views other federal courts as more restrained because they 
“resolve constitutional cases almost exclusively in terms of applicable 
Supreme Court precedent.”190   
There is obvious value to viewing the Supreme Court and other 
federal courts as interacting hierarchically. Both casual empiricism and 
empirical studies document the general tendency of lower courts to 
comply with Supreme Court precedent.191 There is also value to viewing 
them as distinct institutions with different jobs to do. There are obvious 
differences between the roles of the Court and other federal courts, just 
as there are differences between the circuit courts and the district 
courts.192 For example, circuit courts have a responsibility to correct 
legal errors to a greater extent than does the Court, and the Court has 
a greater responsibility to ensure uniformity in the interpretation of 
 
 185. Eyer, supra note 53, at 217 (citing Doni Gewirtzman, Lower Court Constitutionalism: 
Circuit Court Discretion in a Complex Adaptive System, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 457, 465–66 (2012)). 
 186. See Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term—Foreword: A Political Court, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 32, 34 (2005).  
 187. Id. at 34, 41. 
 188. Id. at 43. 
 189. Thomas W. Merrill, Originalism, Stare Decisis and the Promotion of Judicial Restraint, 
22 CONST. COMMENT. 271, 286 (2005). 
 190. Id. 
 191. For a skeptical discussion of that literature, see Friedman, supra note 179, at 299–302. 
 192. For example, trial courts are the primary factfinders in the state and federal judicial 
systems. 
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important questions of federal law than do the circuit courts.193 In 
addition, as noted above, Justices are not strictly bound by Supreme 
Court precedent and so have more discretion than other federal 
judges.194 Relatedly, and as noted at the end of Part I, other federal 
courts may be more hesitant than the Court to act on their own in 
response to broad shifts in cultural values, perhaps because in the 
public imagination the Court is viewed more as a lawmaker and the 
circuit courts are viewed more as law appliers.195 For that reason, 
engaged people care substantially more about who sits on the Court 
than who sits on any other court. If one models the federal judicial 
system hierarchically—as a pyramid with one node at the top—there 
are meaningful differences between the functions of that node and the 
functions of each of the increasing number of nodes as one proceeds 
downward. 
And yet, just as there are limits to studying the Supreme Court 
mostly in isolation,196 there are limits to the hierarchical model. One 
lesson of recent gay rights litigation in federal courts around the 
country (and desegregation and reapportionment litigation decades 
earlier) is that the Supreme Court and other federal courts may at times 
interact dialectically, not just hierarchically. Bickel missed that feature 
of their relationship, even though it was apparent at the time, when he 
wrote that “[t]hroughout, of course, the lower courts can act in 
constitutional matters as stop-gap or relatively ministerial decision-
makers only.”197 Bickel, it bears repeating, imagined only a 
“conversation” between the Supreme Court and the American people,198 
which caused him to overlook the “conversation” between the Court and 
other federal courts. The latter conversation helps constitute the federal 
courts as a system—a system in which lines of communication and 
 
 193. Compare, for example, the mandatory jurisdiction of the circuit courts with the certiorari 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.  
 194. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 
478 U.S. 186 (1986)); see also Merrill, supra note 189, at 285 (“The Supreme Court follows a weak 
theory with regard to its own constitutional precedents, whereas the lower courts are regarded as 
being absolutely bound by these precedents.”).  
 195. See, e.g., Eyer, supra note 53, at 202, 217 (so arguing). 
 196. For example, if Bickel had focused more on the relationship between the Court and other 
federal courts, he might have registered the problems that the Court can create for those lower 
courts when it manipulates justiciability doctrines to avoid deciding the merits of a case: other 
federal courts may not know whether to take the Court’s potential manipulations seriously as legal 
doctrine. A possible example is Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013), discussed supra 
note 29. For an analysis of Hollingsworth as a “passive virtues” decision, see Siegel, supra note 23, 
at 135–40. 
 197. BICKEL, supra note 180, at 198. 
 198. BICKEL, supra note 182, at 91.  
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influence can run back and forth, not just down. Again, if one models 
that system as consisting of both nodes and links between nodes, the 
nodes look different—and their functions may in certain situations 
appear more, rather than less, alike—when viewed in the light cast by 
the links.199 
Other scholarship in law and political science recognizes some of 
the limits of the top-down understanding of hierarchical approaches. 
Rather than focusing on the dialectic emphasized in this Article, 
however, such scholarship attacks the hierarchical model’s assumption 
of lower court compliance with Supreme Court precedent. That 
scholarship takes more of a bottom-up approach by conceptualizing the 
lower federal courts as potentially faithless agents who must therefore 
be monitored by the Court to ensure compliance with its decisions.200 
One group of political scientists reports that “[a] wealth of research in 
the last two decades has examined how the Supreme Court (as 
principals) can effectively oversee lower court judges (its agents).”201 
Scholars writing in this area, called “cue theory,”202 have offered a 
variety of solutions. They include ideologically strategic auditing by the 
Court to manage information asymmetry,203 fire alarms by litigants in 
the form of amicus filings or strategic appeals to the Court,204 signals 
 
 199. Cf. Jan G. Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections 
Between Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REV. 169, 236 (1968) (“But the fact is that the 
Supreme Court is not alone, that it shares with all common-law courts the status of existing in the 
tension between the principled universe of ‘logic’ and the expedient requirements of ‘experience.’ ”). 
Deutsch was responding to Bickel’s assertion that “[t]here are crucial differences—which, of 
course, the opinions in Marbury v. Madison and Cohens v. Virginia seek to obscure—between the 
role of the Supreme Court in constitutional cases and the function of courts of general jurisdiction.” 
BICKEL, supra note 180, at 173. 
 200. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 179, at 296 (“Focusing on how compliance is obtained, 
rather than presuming it, gives the positive literature much more of a bottom-up flavor in the 
sense that action at the bottom rungs of the judicial ladder can set the agenda for what happens 
above.”).  
 201. Tom S. Clark & Jonathan P. Kastellec, The Supreme Court and Percolation in the Lower 
Courts: An Optimal Stopping Model, 75 J. POL. 150, 150 (2013).  
 202. The seminal work is Joseph Tanenhaus, Marvin Schick, Matthew Muraskin & Daniel 
Rosen, The Supreme Court’s Certiorari Decisions: Cue Theory, in JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING 111–
32 (Glendon Schubert ed., 1963).  
 203. See, e.g., Charles M. Cameron, Jeffrey A. Segal & Donald Songer, Strategic Auditing in a 
Political Hierarchy: An Informational Model of the Supreme Court’s Certiorari Decisions, 94 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 101, 101 (2000); Matt Spitzer & Eric Talley, Judicial Auditing, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 
649, 667 (2000).  
 204. See, e.g., Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Organized Interests and Agenda Setting 
in the U.S. Supreme Court, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1109, 1110–11 (1988). But see Gregory A. 
Caldeira, John R. Wright & Christopher Zorn, Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in the U.S. 
Supreme Court Revisited 9 (July 17, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2109497 [https://perma.cc/E47V-JF9L]) (“At the same time that the number of amicus 
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from the Solicitor General when certain conditions are met,205 and 
whistleblowing by judges further down the hierarchy in the form of 
dissenting opinions,206 including opinions that read like petitions for a 
writ of certiorari.207 All such proposals imagine the Supreme Court as 
attempting to police other federal courts that might be acting 
strategically or pursuing their own ideological agenda rather than 
seeking to channel the Court’s priorities.208 Such work suggests that 
lower courts can force the Court’s hand,209 thereby impacting the 
content of constitutional law.210 
The bottom-up work canvassed above is more realistic than top-
down approaches because it asks how hierarchy is maintained given 
ideological disagreements between judges on different courts. Like 
 
filings on certiorari have grown—and perhaps owing to it—the influence of those briefs has 
steadily declined.”).  
 205. See, e.g., Michael A. Bailey, Brian Kamoie & Forrest Maltzman, Signals from the Tenth 
Justice: The Political Role of the Solicitor General in Supreme Court Decision Making, 49 AM. J. 
POL. SCI. 72, 72 (2005) (finding that the Court is more receptive to signals from the solicitor general 
(“SG”) when either the Court and the SG are ideologically aligned or when the SG’s signal is 
contrary to her ideological predisposition).  
 206. See, e.g., Deborah Beim, Alexander V. Hirsch & Jonathan P. Kastellec, Whistleblowing 
and Compliance in the Judiciary Hierarchy, 58 AM. J. POL. SCI. 904, 904 (2013) (presenting a model 
showing that whistleblowing is most informative—and therefore most effective in influencing 
compliance in the judicial hierarchy—when it is rare). For legal scholarship on whistleblowing, 
see, for example, Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to 
Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2159 (1998).  
 207. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 631 F.3d 213, 247 (5th Cir. 2011) (Garza, J., specially 
concurring) (“The Supreme Court has chosen this erroneous path and only the Court can rectify 
the error. In the meantime, I write separately to underscore this detour from constitutional first 
principles.”); Ricci v. DeStefano, 530 F.3d 88, 94 (2d Cir. 2008) (Cabranes, J., dissenting from 
denial of reh’g en banc) (“I respectfully dissent from that decision [not to rehear the case en banc], 
without expressing a view on the merits of the questions presented by this appeal, in the hope that 
the Supreme Court will resolve the issues of great significance raised by this case.”). 
 208. A related literature seeks to understand the factors that determine whether lower courts 
treat Supreme Court precedents favorably. See, e.g., Stuart Minor Benjamin & Georg Vanberg, 
Judicial Retirements and the Staying Power of U.S. Supreme Court Decisions, 13 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 5, 10–11 (2016) (citing prominent works in the literature to which it contributes); 
Stuart Minor Benjamin & Bruce A. Desmarais, Standing the Test of Time: The Breadth of Majority 
Coalitions and the Fate of U.S. Supreme Court Precedents, 4 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 445, 446–47 (2012) 
(same). Rather than assuming hierarchy, this literature, too, perceives that lower federal courts 
have some leeway and so influence the impact of Supreme Court opinions.  
 209. For examples, see Florida v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 648 F.3d 
1235, 1328 (11th Cir. 2011) (guaranteeing Supreme Court review by invalidating the “individual 
mandate” in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act); supra note 157 (citing circuit court 
decisions in Heller and Lopez).  
 210. See, e.g., McNollgast, Politics and the Courts: A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and 
the Rule of Law, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1631, 1634 (1995) (“Our theory suggests that the Supreme 
Court will expand the range of lower court decisions that it finds acceptable when faced with 
substantial noncompliance by the lower courts.”).  
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Supreme Court Rule 10,211 such work does not simply assume the 
existence of hierarchy or attribute hierarchy entirely to norm 
internalization by lower court judges. Because such bottom-up 
scholarship posits an adversarial relationship between the Court and 
lower federal courts, however, it cannot account for the phenomenon of 
reciprocal legitimation.  
Closer to the idea of reciprocal legitimation is writing on 
“percolation.” That literature emphasizes the advantages of first 
allowing lower courts to decide novel legal questions for themselves, so 
that the Supreme Court can obtain a full airing of the issues and a 
diversity of opinions before it intervenes.212 The percolation literature 
also takes a bottom-up approach, but like reciprocal legitimation, it 
posits a non-adversarial relationship between the Court and the lower 
federal courts. The more cooperative nature of the relationship helps 
explain why the Justices themselves value percolation: as is well-
known, the Court generally prefers to grant certiorari to resolve circuit 
splits,213 and “mature” splits are typically preferred to “shallow” ones.  
Yet the percolation literature, too, cannot account for either the 
frequency or the nature of reciprocal legitimation. Unlike percolation, 
which is relatively common, reciprocal legitimation is most likely to 
arise when the culture is deeply divided on a question of collective 
constitutional identity; the Court takes sides in the conflict; and in 
doing so it risks some portion of its public legitimacy. In such a 
situation, the Court may determine that its institutional interests are 
best served by moving slowly and deciding less than it is legally entitled 
to decide, and so initially not coercing other federal courts with respect 
to the broader question. Intended reciprocal legitimation is a technique 
that the Court is most likely to use when, in confronting such a 
situation, it anticipates that it is likely to succeed if it first attempts to 
 
 211. See SUP. CT. R. 10(a) (identifying as potentially worthy of review cases in which “a United 
States court of appeals . . . has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial 
proceedings, or sanctioned such a departure by a lower court, as to call for an exercise of this 
Court’s supervisory power”); SUP. CT. R. 10(c) (identifying as potentially worthy of review cases in 
which “a state court or a United States court of appeals . . . has decided an important federal 
question in a way that conflicts with relevant decisions of this Court”).  
 212. For defenses of percolation, see, for example, RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: 
CRISIS AND REFORM 163 (1985), and Lewis A. Kornhauser, Adjudication By a Resource-
Constrained Team: Hierarchy and Precedent in a Judicial System, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1605, 1626 
(1995). For discussion of the percolation literature, see Friedman, supra note 179, at 305–06. 
Critics of percolation raise rule-of-law objections to not treating like cases alike. For a discussion, 
see id. at 306.  
 213. See SUP. CT. R. 10(a) (identifying as potentially worthy of review cases in which “a United 
States court of appeals has entered a decision in conflict with the decision of another United States 
court of appeals on the same important matter”).  
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persuade other federal courts to decide an issue in the Court’s preferred 
way.  
Unlike percolation, moreover, reciprocal legitimation is a 
process in which the Supreme Court is the initial mover and 
encourager, whether intentionally or not. The Supreme Court speaks in 
ways that potentially lend legitimacy to controversial decisions by other 
federal courts that expand the scope of the Court’s decision, and then 
those other courts speak in ways that potentially lend legitimacy to a 
decision by the Court that validates the expansion. As exemplified by 
Brown, Baker, Windsor, and their aftermaths, reciprocal legitimation 
unfolds in iterative, dialectical fashion. Rather than maintaining a top-
down relationship reflective of hierarchy or a bottom-up relationship 
indicative of conflict or percolation, the Supreme Court and other 
federal courts move back and forth. In proceeding side by side, 
moreover, they are not engaged in different enterprises; on the 
contrary, the enterprise itself consists of their interaction and provision 
of mutual support—their provision of reciprocal legitimation.214 
The conversation between the Court and other federal courts, 
which this Article has examined, is not independent of the conversation 
between the Court and the public, which Bickel emphasized. It is 
precisely when the public is deeply divided, and so maintaining the 
Court’s public legitimacy is a concern, that the Court will be most likely 
to leverage its interaction with other federal courts in an attempt to 
legitimate a particular result in the “court” of public opinion. To repeat 
a point from the previous Section, judicial repudiations of state 
prohibitions on same-sex marriage in the wake of Windsor became 
normalized in light of the torrent of (widely reported) federal court 
invalidations, as the Court reminded readers in its opinion in 
Obergefell. 
That normalization process may partially respond to skeptical 
questions about how much of a legitimation effect is actually produced 
by reciprocal legitimation. It is important to underscore, however, that 
this Article has not sought to establish that members of the public and 
 
 214. The tepid reactions of other federal courts to Heller, see supra Section II.B.3, and to Lopez, 
see supra notes 143, 156–157, and accompanying text, raise the question whether one can 
generalize about when those courts will expand the scope of a decision by the Court. Notably, the 
circuit courts in both Heller and Lopez were the first to require significant legal change, and so 
they may have forced the Court’s hand. Other potentially relevant considerations include the pace 
and direction of public opinion; the stances of the political branches; the degree of ideological 
alignment between the Court and other federal courts; whether and how state courts are ruling; 
and whether a litigation campaign has organized around the issue. Interesting questions are 
lurking here, all of which come into view only upon recognizing that legal change in the federal 
judiciary is neither entirely top-down nor bottom-up, but also side-by-side. 
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politicians care whether other courts provide support for Supreme 
Court decisions, and vice versa. It probably counts for something that 
judges are moved to engage in reciprocal legitimation during stressful 
times, but reciprocal legitimation warrants investigation even if the 
Court is mistaken in thinking that the dialectic will enhance its public 
legitimacy—just as the Brown Court’s attempts to moderate may have 
proven counterproductive. 
C. Extensions of the Model 
The model offered in this Article is amenable to several 
extensions. One of them, which is implicit in the reapportionment 
example developed in Part II.B, is to include state courts. State courts 
may at times perform the same function vis-à-vis the U.S. Supreme 
Court as do federal courts. As noted in the Introduction and Part I, the 
majority opinion in Obergefell contains an Appendix B listing state 
legislation and judicial decisions legalizing same-sex marriage.215 The 
Court invoked that appendix once in its opinion, noting the connection 
between the state interventions it referenced in the appendix and the 
decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in the 
Goodridge case.216 The Court did not mention the likely connection 
between the state statutes and judicial decisions listed in the appendix 
and the Court’s own intervention in Lawrence v. Texas,217 which 
occurred the same year as Goodridge. So Obergefell itself appears to be 
an instance in which reciprocal legitimation involved state courts in 
addition to federal courts. The primary difference, as noted at the end 
of the Introduction, is when one dates the beginning of the 
interaction.218 
A second extension would focus on interactions among courts 
entirely within a state judicial system. Today, state courts seem more 
 
 215. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2611 (2015). In addition, the final section of 
Appendix A listed the decisions of state high courts that addressed same-sex marriage. See id. at 
2610. 
 216. Id. at 2597 (“In 2003, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held the State’s 
Constitution guaranteed same-sex couples the right to marry. . . . After that ruling, some 
additional States granted marriage rights to same-sex couples, either through judicial or 
legislative processes. These decisions and statutes are cited in Appendix B, infra.” (citing 
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003))).  
 217. 539 U.S. 558 (2003); see supra note 63 (noting that the Lawrence Court deemed the 
expression of moral opposition to homosexuality an illegitimate state interest). 
 218. There is a robust literature on state constitutionalism and its relationship to 
constitutional norm generation, including at the federal level. For the seminal contribution, see 
Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1147 
(1993). 
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likely to be threatened with defiance by state officials than are federal 
courts. An example is the recent separation of powers dispute in Kansas 
over public school funding. “As advocates of increased school funding 
brought their request to the Kansas Supreme Court,” the New York 
Times reported in 2013, “the staunchly conservative Legislature vowed 
to defy any court orders that it felt trampled on its sovereignty.”219 The 
court and the legislature subsequently proceeded to lock horns, with the 
court repeatedly instructing the legislature “to finance public schools 
equitably, especially poorer districts with less property wealth,”220 or 
face a shutdown of public schools in the state.221 For their part, “many 
lawmakers who think the court was overreaching its authority were 
calling for the Legislature to defy the court.”222 Governor Sam 
Brownback—under pressure for cuts to state programs that many 
attribute to the tax cuts he championed in 2012 and 2013—called the 
legislature into special session to avoid a showdown with the court that 
could close the schools.223 The drama continued until the legislature 
passed a new funding bill during the special session, the governor 
signed it, and the state supreme court quickly issued a decision before 
the deadline accepting the new funding plan and avoiding a shutdown 
of the schools.224 Meanwhile, the Republican Party campaigned—
ultimately unsuccessfully225—to oust four members of the court in the 
upcoming retention election.226 
Because state judges are more likely than federal judges to be 
threatened with disobedience (and to have to stand for re-election), 
state judges may more frequently have reason to take steps to protect 
their public legitimacy. If that is right, then the phenomenon of 
reciprocal legitimation may be more likely to arise in state judicial 
 
 219. John Eligon, Kansas Legislature Threatens Showdown with Court over School Financing, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/09/us/kansas-legislature-threatens-
showdown-with-court-over-school-financing.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/7MJ6-DLZ8]. 
 220. Julie Bosman, Kansas Parents Worry Schools Are Slipping Amid Budget Battles, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 31, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/01/us/kansas-parents-worry-schools-are-
slipping-amid-budget-battles.html [https://perma.cc/X62Q-FBHM]. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Joe Robertson et al., Gov. Sam Brownback Calls Kansas Lawmakers into Special Session 
on Schools, KAN. CITY STAR (June 7, 2016, 11:20 AM), http://www.kansascity.com/news/ politics-
government/article82238222.html [https://perma.cc/VX22-2LMK]. 
 223. Bosman, supra note 220; Robertson et al., supra note 222. 
 224. See Kansas Supreme Court Elections, 2016, BALLOTPEDIA: THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
AMERICAN POLITICS, https://ballotpedia.org/Kansas_Supreme_Court_elections,_2016 (last visited 
Feb. 22, 2017) [https://perma.cc/3FSF-FEX2]. 
 225. See id. 
 226. See Sam Zeff, Get Ready for a Raucous Kansas Supreme Court Retention Race, KCUR.ORG 
(May 24, 2016), http://kcur.org/post/get-ready-raucous-kansas-supreme-court-retention-
race#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/S4H6-8E9P]. 
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systems than in the federal system. Whether that hypothesis is 
correct—whether state high courts and other state courts rely upon one 
another for mutual support in politically stressful times—warrants 
scholarly investigation. If that hypothesis is incorrect, then it is worth 
examining whether and why state courts seek to safeguard their public 
legitimacy in other ways,227 including by avoiding the sort of 
controversy that might tempt judges to pursue reciprocal legitimation 
in the first place.  
A third extension would move beyond judges and examine the 
extent to which the Court may pursue reciprocal legitimation with 
powerful non-judicial actors, such as presidents, Congresses, agencies, 
state governments, interest groups, repeat litigants, and social 
movements. As Professor Keith Whittington and others have shown, 
political leaders, especially presidents, have generally had institutional 
reasons to support the Court’s assertions of interpretive authority.228 
And the Court has at times invoked congressional deliberations and 
federal statutes or regulations as partial authority for its own 
decisions.229 There seems no inherent reason why reciprocal 
legitimation would be limited to interactions among judges, given that 
political actors may also perceive the need to look outside themselves in 
order to legitimate their publicly controversial decisions. 
Finally, the relationship between reciprocal legitimation and 
democratic experimentation warrants examination. It is possible that 
reciprocal legitimation can sometimes blend into societal 
experimentation and learning. For example, suppose that instead of 
deciding Obergefell two years after Windsor, the Supreme Court had 
decided it five years later. In the interim, a large number of same-sex 
marriages would have taken place, and Americans who were either 
opposed to or uncertain about same-sex marriage would have seen that 
the sky did not fall. They may have already seen that the sky did not 
 
 227. See, e.g., Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (holding that state law’s limitation of 
marriage to opposite-sex couples violates the state constitution, but permitting the legislature to 
choose between allowing same-sex couples to marry and allowing them to form civil unions with 
every benefit of marriage). 
 228. See generally WHITTINGTON, supra note 165.  
 229. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 687–88 (1973) (“Thus, Congress itself has 
concluded that classifications based upon sex are inherently invidious, and this conclusion of a 
coequal branch of Government is not without significance to the question presently under 
consideration.”); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819) (“The principle now 
contested was introduced at a very early period of our history, has been recognised by many 
successive legislatures, and has been acted upon by the judicial department, in cases of peculiar 
delicacy, as a law of undoubted obligation.”). 
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fall in the years before Obergefell, but with more time additional 
evidence would have accumulated.230 
IV. RECIPROCAL LEGITIMATION AND JUDICIAL CANDOR 
Because reciprocal legitimation has not previously been 
identified, the primary purposes of this Article are descriptive and 
analytical, not normative. So far, accordingly, the Article has sought to 
name and understand reciprocal legitimation, to document several 
instances of the phenomenon or its absence, to connect it to more 
familiar judicial behaviors, and to explore its implications for 
scholarship in constitutional law, federal courts, and judicial politics. 
Before evaluating a judicial practice, it seems more important first to 
understand the practice, including from the perspective of the judges 
who engage in it.  
Yet reciprocal legitimation—especially, but not only, its 
intentional variant—does potentially raise normative concerns. That is 
because the Justices who participate in the process tend to compromise 
judicial candor in the service of protecting the Court’s public legitimacy. 
This Part defends a rebuttable presumption in favor of judicial candor, 
identifies stronger and weaker justifications for judicial opinions that 
lack full candor, and applies its analysis to Windsor and Obergefell. 
A. A Definition and Defense of a Presumption Favoring Candor 
In an influential essay defending a strong presumption in favor 
of judicial candor, Professor David Shapiro explained that a statement 
lacks candor when the person making it believes it to be false, and the 
person makes the statement either with the intent to mislead a target 
audience, or with indifference to whether the statement will deceive 
that audience.231 Shapiro’s conceptualization extends to omissions. An 
omission lacks candor when the failure to disclose is designed to 
mislead the target audience in some material way about what has been 
said, or when the speaker is indifferent to the fact that the omission will 
render what she has said materially deceptive.232 One could puzzle over 
the requisite mens rea (for example, intent, knowledge, or recklessness) 
 
 230. Cf. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It 
is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens 
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the 
rest of the country.”). 
 231. See Shapiro, supra note 16, at 732. 
 232. Id. at 732–33. 
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of a speaker for her statement or omission to qualify as lacking candor. 
But what matters most for present purposes is that the presence or 
absence of candor depends upon the mental state of the speaker.233  
Both intended and unintended reciprocal legitimation raise 
potential concerns about an absence of candor, because both may 
involve the same lack of forthrightness at the end of the process about 
the Court’s own causal influence earlier in the process. For example, it 
seems less than entirely candid for the Court in Obergefell to have 
repeatedly characterized its own intervention in favor of marriage 
equality only as an effect of developments in the lower federal courts 
and elsewhere, and not also as a cause of those developments.  
Although both variants of reciprocal legitimation potentially 
raise normative concerns, the potential concerns with intended 
reciprocal legitimation are greater. That is because it implicates 
additional questions about a lack of full candor at the start of the 
process. For example, it was potentially misleading for the Court in 
Windsor to have spoken out of both sides of its mouth, including by 
introducing a novel “federalism” analysis that seemed more 
instrumentally useful in temporarily limiting the scope of the holding 
than it was logically necessary, persuasive on its own terms, or likely to 
decide any future cases.234 It seems likely that some opponents of same-
sex marriage who invoked the federalism reasoning in Windsor for their 
own purposes felt manipulated or misled upon learning the holding in 
Obergefell.235  
Perhaps the Court was not misleading sophisticated consumers 
of its opinions, who might be thought to know better. Yet as noted in 
 
 233. See id. at 732 (“[T]he declarant’s state of mind is crucial.”). 
 234. One might object that the federalism analysis in Windsor illuminated the equal protection 
question by showing that the federal law’s uniqueness impugned Congress’s motives in enacting 
it. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young & Erin C. Blondel, Federalism, Liberty, and Equality in United States 
v. Windsor, 2012–2013 CATO SUP. CT. REV 117, 119 (concluding that federalism “played a critical 
role” in the Court’s opinion). Straightforward equal protection reasoning would have sufficed, 
however, and defining marriage for all federal purposes as including same-sex marriages would 
be just as unusual as excluding them but would not be suspicious. Moreover, it is difficult to 
identify another actual or hypothetical federal law that would be unconstitutional on similar 
federalism grounds. For a discussion, see generally Siegel, supra note 23. As discussed infra 
Section IV.B, however, the Court was being candid if it believed what it wrote about the federalism 
problems with the statute and was not using federalism reasoning for other purposes. 
 235. See, e.g., Eric Restuccia & Aaron Lindstrom, Federalism and the Authority of the States 
to Define Marriage, SCOTUSBLOG (June 27, 2013), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/ 
federalism-and-the-authority-of-the-states-to-define-marriage/ [https://perma.cc/G9GA-E7ZM]: 
[T]he principles in Windsor of respect for state sovereignty and the authority of the 
people of the states to define marriage support the conclusion that the Court will affirm 
the constitutionality of those states that have reaffirmed the historic understanding of 
marriage—the union of one man and one woman. 
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Part I, a number of federal judges, including some eminent ones, read 
Windsor as a federalism opinion, even after Justice Scalia repeatedly 
called out the Court in Windsor for the federalism language in the 
majority opinion.236 Moreover, no dissenter in Obergefell criticized the 
Court for the conduct identified in this Article, even as each dissenter 
otherwise seemed eager to undermine the Court’s legitimacy.237  
Whatever its impact on close observers of its work, the Court 
may be misleading less sophisticated readers of its opinions—or 
Americans who hear about the Court’s decisions from less sophisticated 
readers in the news media. They may not realize the extent of the 
Court’s own role in creating, perhaps intentionally, a bandwagon effect 
in the federal courts—not in the states—throughout the nation. Nor 
may they realize that they are not being told the whole truth when the 
Court in Obergefell invokes the results of a process in support of its 
decision with no recognition that it had played a part in producing the 
process.238 That group may include first-year law students, whose 
edited casebook versions of Obergefell likely omit Appendix A and at 
least some of the Court’s several references to it.  
Transparency, and therefore candor, is a core value of the rule 
of law, and frequently detected absences of candor can strain the subtle 
relationships of trust that sustain the rule of law.239 Expressively, 
moreover, an absence of candor suggests that a particular audience is 
not entitled to the truth or cannot be trusted with the truth, and so is 
 
 236. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2705 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“My 
guess is that the majority . . . needs some rhetorical basis to support its pretense that today’s 
prohibition of laws excluding same-sex marriage is confined to the Federal Government (leaving 
the second, state-law shoe to be dropped later, maybe next Term).” (footnote omitted)); id. at 2710: 
[T]hat Court which finds it so horrific that Congress irrationally and hatefully robbed 
same-sex couples of the “personhood and dignity” which state legislatures conferred 
upon them, will of a certitude be similarly appalled by state legislatures’ irrational and 
hateful failure to acknowledge that “personhood and dignity” in the first place.  
(citation to majority opinion omitted); id. (“The majority’s limiting assurance will be meaningless 
in the face of language like that, as the majority well knows. That is why the language is there.”). 
 237. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2626 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I 
write separately to call attention to this Court’s threat to American democracy.”); id. at 2630 n.22: 
If, even as the price to be paid for a fifth vote, I ever joined an opinion for the Court that 
began: “The Constitution promises liberty to all within its reach, a liberty that includes 
certain specific rights that allow persons, within a lawful realm, to define and express 
their identity,” I would hide my head in a bag. The Supreme Court of the United States 
has descended from the disciplined legal reasoning of John Marshall and Joseph Story 
to the mystical aphorisms of the fortune cookie. 
 238. See Jack M. Balkin, The Supreme Court Simulates a State Bandwagon Effect in Favor of 
Same-Sex Marriage, BALKINIZATION (Oct. 7, 2014), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/10/the-
supreme-court-simulates-state.html [https://perma.cc/N4JU-NFDH]. 
 239. For a discussion of rule-of-law values and the political foundations of the rule of law, see 
Siegel, supra note 87, at 965–69. 
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undeserving of equal respect.240 It demeans the dignity of people to 
mislead them, at least without substantial justification for doing so.241 
To fully grasp this point, one need only recall instances in which one 
has received important communications that in material ways lacked 
candor, only to later learn the full truth of the matter.  
In addition, obligations of reason giving are typically (although 
not invariably) imposed on judges. They are imposed in important part 
to discipline the exercise of judicial power—to subject judicial decisions 
to critical scrutiny. Absent an obligation of candor, however, that 
method of discipline is greatly diminished. As Professor David Shapiro 
observes, “[J]udges who regard themselves as free to distort or misstate 
the reasons for their actions can avoid the sanctions of criticism and 
condemnation that honest disclosure of their motivation may entail.”242 
All that said, the complexity of the normative question eludes a 
simple admonition that the Court should be forthright in every respect 
in every case. One need not agree with Professor Martin Shapiro that 
“[c]ourts and judges always lie,” or that “[l]ying is the nature of the 
judicial activity,”243 to register that judicial opinion writing (and 
joining) is a genre of communication engaged in by individuals who are 
performing a particular institutional role with its own sometimes subtle 
rules and expectations. For example, the Court does not generally 
regard itself as permitted to acknowledge that it makes law even 
though many observers understand that it has little choice but to make 
law in significant respects.244 Accordingly, it can be difficult to 
determine what kinds of forthrightness about which issues are required 
in a judicial opinion. 
In addition, it has long been recognized that the Brown Court’s 
narrow focus on education, as opposed to the relationship between 
segregation and equality more generally, was not a model of candor, nor 
 
 240. Cf. Shapiro, supra note 16, at 736–37 (“[L]ack of candor often carries with it the 
implication that the listener is less capable of dealing with the truth, and thus less worthy of 
respect, than the speaker.”). 
 241. See Neil S. Siegel, Interring the Rhetoric of Judicial Activism, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 555, 
598 (2010): 
[I]nstrumental considerations aside, there are dignitary harms associated with 
misleading the public about the nature and function of judicial review. It is wrong to 
deceive people—and thereby to diminish their apprehension of the governmental 
institutions under which they live—in the absence of very good reason for doing so. 
 242. Shapiro, supra note 16, at 737. 
 243. Martin Shapiro, Judges as Liars, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 155, 156 (1994). It is not 
obvious how to reconcile such statements with Shapiro’s earlier criticisms of Brown and Baker for 
lacking candor. See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
 244. For discussions, see generally, for example, Post & Siegel, supra note 83; Neil S. Siegel, 
Umpires at Bat: On Integration and Legitimation, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 701 (2007). 
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were the subsequent unreasoned per curiams.245 That concern, 
however, may have been the least of the Court’s problems. Brown 
exemplifies the truth that complete candor is not always the best policy 
in law or life.246 A scholar who saw this before others is Professor Jan 
Deutsch, who passed away while this Article was being written. 
Deutsch intervened in the late 1960s in response to the criticisms of the 
Court’s segregation and reapportionment decisions by both Professor 
Herbert Wechsler (wielding his “neutral principles”) and Professor 
Martin Shapiro (wielding his “political jurisprudence”).247 Deutsch 
brilliantly observed that “the Court, as an institution, has certain 
institutional needs—for example, the needs to ensure survival and 
operate efficiently,” and “those needs are necessarily reflected in the 
form and content of its work.”248 Those needs, he added, preclude fully 
candid judicial opinions.249  
The Court sometimes finds itself operating in a fallen world—
that is, a world in which important constitutional rights have yet to be 
protected due to public and professional opposition.250 In such a world, 
the Court may have its work cut out for itself as it seeks to secure the 
public legitimacy of divisive decisions that vindicate basic 
constitutional values. If, as Professor Akhil Amar has suggested, “the 
judicial province and duty is not merely to say what the law is, but also 
to make the law real,”251 then Brown’s professed narrowness is 
potentially supported by sufficient justification. Demanding full candor 
is sometimes asking too much of government officials, including 
Justices, who may be trying in good faith to execute their 
responsibilities in circumstances in which others are undermining their 
ability to do so for reasons that are themselves difficult to defend. 
In less extreme circumstances, a Court whose view of the law 
warrants a relatively maximalist response to a legal question may 
 
 245. See supra Section II.B.1 (discussing the conduct of the Brown Court). 
 246. See, e.g., Deutsch, supra note 199, at 240 (“No marriage is perfect, and precious few are 
great, but the fact that any marriage would disintegrate under the stress of an insistent demand 
for complete candor is nevertheless sufficient to convince us that intellectual honesty is inadequate 
as the sole criterion for selection of a marital partner.”). 
 247. See supra notes 94, 123, and accompanying text (citing the work of Wechsler and 
Shapiro). 
 248. Deutsch, supra note 199, at 213. 
 249. See id. at 249 (“Shapiro’s condemnation of the reapportionment and segregation 
decisions, like the insistence on candor that results in the coalescence of his assessments of the 
Court’s work with those of [Wechsler and Hand], thus arises from his disregard of the institutional 
needs of the Court.”). 
 250. See generally JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN 
UNJUST WORLD (2011). 
 251. AMAR, supra note 107, at 215. 
1-Siegel_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 5/1/2017 1:59 PM 
1236 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:4:1183 
 
nonetheless write a relatively minimalist opinion for a variety of 
potentially worthwhile reasons that it is not prepared to announce 
publicly, because doing so would be self-undermining or would appear 
political. For example the Court may be seeking to maintain collegiality 
within the Court, which may be essential to its efficient functioning well 
beyond the case under review.252 Or the Court may be trying to 
maintain some measure of solidarity in American society, which may 
be threatened to a greater extent by more decisive judicial 
interventions.253 Or the Court may be trying to put stakeholders on 
notice that a substantial change in the law is coming, thereby reducing 
reliance interests in a gradual way. Such rationales for relative 
minimalism, even if they are not publicly articulated, seem 
distinguishable from situations in which the Court is simply trying to 
insulate itself from professional criticism by presenting itself as more 
restrained than it is or intends to be. 
It is challenging to reconcile all of the competing considerations 
canvassed above. Without delving deeper into a difficult topic, however, 
it seems reasonable to conclude—and in any event the following 
analysis will assume—that the Court is generally obliged to be candid 
regarding the reasons for its interventions and decisions, but that this 
obligation is defeasible in the face of adequate justification. At one end 
of the spectrum of justifications, Brown-like reasons—that is, making 
the law real for people on the ground, and sustaining the Court’s public 
legitimacy in the face of real threats of defiance or recriminations—
seem like adequate justifications for judicial opinions that are not fully 
candid. At the other end of the spectrum, an attempt by the Court to 
insulate itself from accountability for its decisions—from professional 
and public criticism—is inadequate justification for abandoning judicial 
candor. In between those extremes, concerns sounding in collegiality, 
solidarity, or reliance potentially justify opinions that lack full candor, 
but whether such concerns can carry the day depends on the 
circumstances—on the extent to which such concerns are pressing and 
the extent of the sacrifice of candor. 
 
 252. See supra Section II.B.2 (noting the Baker majority’s loyalty to Justice Stewart even when 
it no longer needed his vote); cf., e.g., Deutsch, supra note 199, at 213 (emphasizing the Court’s 
need to operate efficiently). 
 253. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME 
COURT 50 (1999) (explaining that narrow, shallow Supreme Court opinions “are efforts to achieve 
both social stability and a degree of reciprocity, together with mutual respect, under conditions 
that threaten to endanger these important values”). 
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B. Windsor and Obergefell 
With that admittedly rough conceptualization of the problem in 
mind, this Part turns back to Windsor and Obergefell. Any attempt to 
evaluate the Court’s candor in those cases must confront a serious 
problem, which the previous Section anticipated. Candor turns on 
subjective intent, and one cannot be certain what the Court was 
intending. The Justices in the majority have not told us, and no 
“smoking gun” evidence is available to date. 
If the Court was not trying to mislead anyone with its federalism 
analysis in Windsor and with its invocations of other federal court 
decisions in Obergefell, then the opinions suffered from no lack of 
candor.254 But even if the Court was being somewhat disingenuous in 
those opinions for the reasons articulated above, it does not appear that 
it was being entirely disingenuous. Windsor can be understood as a 
quasi-Bickelian intervention: the Court made a move in what appears 
to have been an interaction with other federal courts and then waited 
to see whether and how those courts would take it up on its offer.255 The 
Court’s intervention appeared genuinely Bickelian, not simply 
disingenuous, for at least two reasons. 
First, other federal courts were not required as a matter of 
vertical stare decisis to respond as the Court wanted them to respond. 
As noted in Part I, the Court gave more socially conservative or cautious 
courts the resources with which to reject the Court’s offer. As also 
documented in Part I, moreover, some of those courts (and individual 
judges on other courts) did reject the offer.256 And the Court took the 
 
 254. Perhaps Justice Kennedy, the author of the majority opinion in Windsor, is differently 
situated from the other members of the majority. The question for them is whether collegiality 
concerns justified their signing onto federalism reasoning they found unpersuasive (assuming they 
did). According to David Shapiro, “[T]he sticking point can and should be an unwillingness to make 
or join in a statement that does not represent the judge’s views and that will mislead the opinion’s 
readers as to what those views are.” Shapiro, supra note 16, at 743. That standard, however, may 
ask too much of a nine-judge court that issues more than seventy opinions a year. It also seems 
unlikely that most readers will be misled given the understanding that Justices often join opinions 
containing reasoning to which they do not subscribe. 
 255. Cf. BICKEL, supra note 182, at 91 (“Virtually all important decisions of the Supreme Court 
are the beginnings of conversations between the Court and the people and their representatives.”). 
Windsor is best thought of as a continuation of a preexisting conversation that began with Romer 
v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). See supra notes 20–22 
and accompanying text; supra Section III.C. Moreover, as explored in Section III.B, the 
conversation was not just between the Court and the public, but also between the Court and other 
federal courts. 
 256. As Richard Re has observed, Justice Scalia encouraged federal and state courts to 
distinguish Windsor. Richard M. Re, Narrowing Precedent in the Supreme Court, 114 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1861, 1909 (2014) (quoting United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2709 (2013) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting)). 
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risk (even if a relatively modest one) that it would have to decide 
whether to rule in favor of marriage equality in the teeth of numerous 
federal court decisions reading Windsor as assigning to the states the 
authority to decide the issue of same-sex marriage. The genuine ability 
of other courts not to move in the direction to which the Court was 
pointing lends some legitimacy to the Court’s reliance on the rulings of 
those courts that did follow along. To borrow concepts from other areas 
of law, the consent given by the circuit courts seemed voluntary and 
informed; they were not acting under duress. 
On the other hand, Professors David Klein and Neal Devins offer 
empirical evidence that federal and state courts almost always follow a 
statement in an opinion of a higher court even though it is dictum and 
so outside the boundaries of formal precedent.257 Matters may look 
different from the account offered immediately above if federal courts 
in same-sex marriage cases conceived of their role as predicting what 
the Supreme Court would do or want258 or were simply concerned about 
being reversed when future intervention by the Court was virtually 
assured.259 Matters may look different because of the relatively strong 
signal that the Court sent in Windsor.  
Even so, there remains a difference between a nudge from the 
Court, which preserves circuit court decisionmaking autonomy, and a 
shove from the Court, which does not. As noted in Part I.B, the Court 
in Windsor offered a nudge. It also seems likely that circuit judges care 
less about 7-2, 6-3, or 5-4 reversals, which are more likely to be 
interpreted as reflecting legitimate disagreement, than about 8-1 or 9-0 
reversals, which are more likely to sting and cause embarrassment.260 
It was obvious after Windsor that there were not more than five votes 
 
 257. David Klein & Neal Devins, Dicta, Schmicta: Theory Versus Practice in Lower Court 
Decision Making, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2021, 2036–42 (2013). 
 258. See generally Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects 
of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1994) (advocating a prediction-based 
jurisprudence for use by judges). But see Michael C. Dorf, Prediction and the Rule of Law, 42 UCLA 
L. REV. 651, 715 (1995) (arguing that, as a general matter, a prediction-based approach to judging 
undermines the rule of law). 
 259. Some commentators argue that judges are motivated by reversal avoidance. See, e.g., 
Caminker, supra note 258, at 77 (“Much anecdotal evidence suggests that lower court judges 
dislike being reversed on appeal.”). Others disagree, particularly regarding federal circuit judges, 
in part because of the general unlikelihood of Supreme Court review. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, 
OVERCOMING LAW 118–19 (1995) (“[A]version to reversal . . . is . . . fairly unimportant in the case 
of court of appeals judges because reversals . . . have become rare and most reflect differences in 
judicial philosophy or legal policy rather than mistake or incompetence by the appellate judges.”); 
Richard A. Posner, Judicial Behavior and Performance: An Economic Approach, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 1259, 1273 (2005). 
 260. Thanks to Dean David Levi for sharing this insight. Judge Richard Posner makes a 
similar point in the works cited supra note 259. 
1-Siegel_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 5/1/2017 1:59 PM 
2017] RECIPROCAL LEGITIMATION 1239 
 
on the Supreme Court for invalidating any state prohibition on same-
sex marriage. Judges are also less likely to care about reversal when 
they care deeply about the issue. For many judges, the constitutional 
status of same-sex marriage is probably such an issue. 
Second, the Court did not appear to be engaged in a complete 
charade, even if its federalism analysis in Windsor left something to be 
desired from the internal point of view.261 Rather, the Court seemed 
interested in the ideas that had bubbled up from the courts of appeals. 
For example, commentators have debated why Justice Kennedy 
primarily wrote a substantive due process opinion (that is, one based 
upon the right to marry)262 and not one or another classification-based 
equal protection opinion (that is, one finding unjustified discrimination 
on the basis of sexual orientation or sex). In search of answers, 
commentators have emphasized such explanations as Justice 
Kennedy’s libertarianism, his desire to avoid deciding certain 
discrimination claims, and the virulence of conservative reactions to the 
Court’s charges of animus in Windsor.263 Commentators have not, 
however, considered what the Court may have learned from other 
federal courts.  
There was a basic difference between the majority opinions that 
four circuit courts issued in favor of marriage equality. The opinions of 
the Fourth and Tenth Circuits, which rested on the right to marry, were 
more respectful of opponents of same-sex marriage, and they were less 
incendiary and broad than the opinions of the Seventh and Ninth 
Circuits, which found unconstitutional discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation.264 Even though the Court in Windsor mostly wrote 
 
 261. See supra note 234 and accompanying text (identifying problems with the Court’s 
federalism reasoning in Windsor).  
 262. There is equality reasoning and an equal protection holding at the end of the majority 
opinion, but even there the Court emphasizes discrimination in providing access to a fundamental 
right, not classification-based equal protection. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 
(2015). 
 263. For various hypotheses, see, for example, PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS 2015 SUPPLEMENT 133 (6th ed. 2015). 
 264. Compare Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 377 (4th Cir. 2014) (“Lawrence and Windsor 
indicate that the choices that individuals make in the context of same-sex relationships enjoy the 
same constitutional protection as the choices accompanying opposite-sex relationships.”), and 
Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070, 1096–97 (10th Cir. 2014) (Holmes, J., concurring) (“I write here . . . 
to focus on one significant thing that the district court wisely did not do in rendering its substantive 
ruling on the same-sex marriage ban. Specifically, the district court declined to rely upon animus 
doctrine in striking down SQ 711.”), with Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 656 (7th Cir. 2014) (“The 
challenged laws discriminate against a minority defined by an immutable characteristic, and the 
only rationale that the states put forth with any conviction—that same-sex couples and their 
children don’t need marriage because same-sex couples can’t produce children, intended or 
unintended—is so full of holes that it cannot be taken seriously.”), and Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 
456, 473 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Windsor makes clear that the defendants’ explicit desire to express a 
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an equality-based, animus opinion,265 the Court in Obergefell mostly 
shifted from equality to liberty and followed the approach adopted by 
the Fourth and Tenth Circuits. Emphasizing that there is an identity 
between opposite-sex couples and same-sex couples regarding every 
reason why the right to marry is protected today, the Court avoided 
holding or implying that proponents of traditional marriage in state 
after state had an invidious purpose or that sexual orientation 
discrimination triggers heightened scrutiny in every context.266  
Accordingly, if the federal courts were not moving entirely 
independently of the Supreme Court, neither were they responding 
entirely dependently. Because other federal courts were allowed to 
weigh in—and because the Court seemed to care about how they 
weighed in—before the Court decided the issue for itself, the Court’s 
approach seems relatively conversational and participatory. Even as 
the Court was nudging, it was also learning and adapting. Indeed, it is 
not clear that the Court had decided in Windsor to invalidate all state 
prohibitions on same-sex marriage. For example, if most other federal 
courts had reacted differently to Windsor, or if the backlash to 
invalidations had been substantially greater, the Court may have been 
open to means of postponement. (That does not mean, however, that the 
Court was using other federal courts merely as bellwethers for public 
opinion, not as potential sources of support. If the Court had been using 
those courts only as bellwethers, it probably would not have spent so 
much time talking about them in Obergefell.) 
To be sure, a more cynical interpretation of Windsor and 
Obergefell is possible. On that view, the Court’s conduct in both cases 
was a manipulative ruse, similar to the protestations in Bush v. Gore267 
 
preference for opposite-sex couples over same-sex couples is a categorically inadequate justification 
for discrimination. Expressing such a preference is precisely what they may not do.”). 
 265. See supra notes 23–28 and accompanying text (discussing the majority opinion in 
Windsor). 
 266. At this point, whether the right to marry articulated in Obergefell includes three-person 
or incestuous marriages is mostly the stuff of law school hypotheticals, unlike whether states may 
discriminate against gay people in employment, housing, education, adoption, and family 
formation. Practically, therefore, the Court’s liberty holding is narrower than an equality holding 
likely would have been. 
 267. Compare Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000) (per curiam) (“When contending parties 
invoke the process of the courts, however, it becomes our unsought responsibility to resolve the 
federal and constitutional issues the judicial system has been forced to confront.”), with id. at 126–
27 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Recognizing these principles, the majority nonetheless orders the 
termination of the contest proceeding before all such votes have been tabulated. Under their own 
reasoning, the appropriate course of action would be to remand to allow more specific procedures 
for implementing the legislature’s uniform general standard to be established.”). 
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and Citizens United v. FEC268 that the Court simply had to end the 
controversy—there was no choice—when the Court itself was arguably 
responsible for creating the perceived conditions of compulsion. It 
seems improbable, however, that the Court would have ruled in favor 
of marriage equality when it did, and on the grounds that it did, 
regardless of how other federal courts responded to Windsor. Although 
the Court may not have been entirely candid in Windsor and Obergefell, 
it also seems overstated to conclude that other federal courts were only 
its props, and not also its partners, along the path to Obergefell. 
Not only is it unlikely that the Court was simply being 
disingenuous in Windsor and Obergefell, but it also seems defensible to 
conclude that the Court had reason to fear at least some acts of defiance 
up and down the hierarchies of certain state governments and, more 
importantly, to fear recriminations directed at members of the LGBT 
community. Exemplifying concerns about compliance were the actions 
of Chief Justice Roy Moore in Alabama269 and County Clerk Kim Davis 
in Kentucky.270 Exemplifying concerns about recriminations are the 
actions by certain states to prohibit measures protecting LGBT persons 
from discrimination and to require transgender individuals to use 
public bathrooms corresponding to their biological sex, not their gender 
identity.271 Windsor was clearly not Brown in this regard, but neither 
 
 268. Compare Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 329 (2010) (“[T]he lack of a valid basis for 
an alternative ruling requires full consideration of the continuing effect of the speech suppression 
upheld in Austin.”), with id. at 398 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Essentially, five Justices were 
unhappy with the limited nature of the case before us, so they changed the case to give themselves 
an opportunity to change the law.”). 
 269. See, e.g., Alan Blinder, Top Alabama Judge Orders Halt to Same-Sex Marriage Licenses, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/07/us/top-alabama-judge-orders-halt-
to-same-sex-marriage-licenses.html?ref=topics [https://perma.cc/L7W9-W9BT] (“The chief justice 
of the Alabama Supreme Court, Roy S. Moore, on Wednesday effectively ordered probate judges in 
the state not to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples, a move that could cloud the carrying 
out of the United States Supreme Court decision that legalized same-sex unions.”); see also V.L. v. 
E.L., 136 S. Ct. 1017, 1019 (2016) (per curiam) (holding unanimously that the Alabama Supreme 
Court erred in refusing to grant full faith and credit to a judgment by a Georgia court making a 
woman the legal parent of the children she had raised with her same-sex partner since birth, 
because the judgment appears on its face to have been issued by a court with jurisdiction and there 
is no established Georgia law to the contrary). 
 270. See, e.g., Alan Blinder & Richard Pérez-Peña, Kim Davis, Released from Kentucky Jail, 
Won’t Say if She Will Keep Defying Court, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2015/09/09/us/kim-davis-same-sex-marriage.html [https://perma.cc/7J8F-MEPJ]: 
After five nights in jail for refusing to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples, Kim 
Davis, a Kentucky county clerk, walked free Tuesday to a roar of cheers from thousands 
of supporters, but she and her lawyer would not say whether she would continue to defy 
court orders and try to block the licenses. 
 271. See, e.g., Dave Philipps, North Carolina Bans Local Anti-Discrimination Policies, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 23, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/24/us/north-carolina-to-limit-bathroom-
use-by-birth-gender.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/4E4F-BW9W]: 
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does it seem appropriate to conclude that the Court in Windsor and 
Obergefell may have compromised the obligation of judicial candor 
merely in order to insulate itself from public criticism. 
CONCLUSION 
From the perspective of the relationship between the Supreme 
Court and other federal courts, what may be most interesting about 
United States v. Windsor and Obergefell v. Hodges is what the casebooks 
have taken out of the majority opinion in Obergefell. They have removed 
its appendix, along with the opinion’s several references to it. In all 
likelihood, the Court’s own conduct in Windsor was also a cause, and 
not just an effect, of the federal court decisions referenced in Appendix 
A. The Court’s conduct in Windsor may also have been an intended 
cause. 
The interaction between the Court and other federal courts 
beginning in Windsor and ending in Obergefell is reminiscent of the 
judicial conduct in racial segregation and reapportionment cases 
decades earlier. The judicial interaction in recent marriage equality 
cases exemplifies the potential power of judges to help produce 
constitutional change. It also illuminates a nonobvious aspect of the 
relationship between the Court and other courts in the system that they 
collectively constitute.  
For those who seek to understand how the American 
constitutional system operates, reciprocal legitimation—different 
courts invoking one another as authority in iterative fashion—warrants 
examination even without an assertion or proof of initial subjective 
intent. But it is worth considering whether instances of reciprocal 
legitimation were initially intended, as perilous as that inquiry can be, 
because an affirmative answer raises the question of why the Court 
decided to proceed in that fashion. An affirmative answer may also 
affect a normative evaluation of the Court’s conduct—specifically, the 
extent to which judicial candor may permissibly be sacrificed in order 
to vindicate other values. Indeed, intended reciprocal legitimation may 
be the most interesting and controversial variant of the phenomenon 
 
The state bill, put together so quickly that many lawmakers had not seen it before it 
was introduced Wednesday morning, specifically bars people in North Carolina from 
using bathrooms that do not match their birth gender, and goes further to prohibit 
municipalities from creating their own antidiscrimination policies. Instead, it creates a 
statewide antidiscrimination policy—one that does not mention gay and transgender 
people. 
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because it is indicative of a Court that can and does help shape the very 
gestalt or public opinion to which it is often thought to respond.  
The Court “labors under the obligation to succeed” not only in 
moving the American public,272 but also in nudging federal judges. 
There is always a risk that the Court will fail. But if the Court does 
succeed, it will have earned the opportunity to invoke other federal 
court rulings as authority for its own decisive decision in virtue of the 
fact that it had previously permitted those courts to decide for 
themselves.273 
CODA:  
PRESIDENT TRUMP’S POTENTIAL THREAT TO JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 
This Article is making its way through the publication process 
during a time in which the President of the United States, Donald J. 
Trump, is disparaging the federal courts and particular federal judges 
in ways that are unprecedented in modern times.274 The President has 
given specific indications that, in the event of a terrorist attack, he will 
blame the federal courts as well as the news media, which he 
implausibly alleges is under-reporting such attacks.275 For example, the 
 
 272. BICKEL, supra note 180, at 239 (“The Court is a leader of opinion, not a mere register of 
it, but it must lead opinion, not merely impose its own; and—the short of it is—it labors under the 
obligation to succeed.”). 
 273. Reciprocal legitimation may help explain why judicial decisions invalidating bans on 
same-sex marriage did not trigger the degree of backlash that theorists of the phenomenon had 
earlier predicted. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH. 
L. REV. 431, 459–72 (2005). Klarman later qualified his claims. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM 
THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS, BACKLASH, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 
(2013). So did William Eskridge. See William N. Eskridge Jr., Backlash Politics: How 
Constitutional Litigation Has Advanced Marriage Equality in the United States, 93 B.U. L. REV. 
275, 295–96 (2013). 
 274. See, e.g., Peter Baker, Trump Clashes Early with Courts, Portending Years of Legal 
Battles, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/05/us/politics/donald-trump-
mike-pence-travel-ban-judge.html [https://perma.cc/SV5X-KQNL] (quoting the opinion of Jack 
Goldsmith, head of the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel under President George W. 
Bush, that “Trump’s serial attacks on judges and the judiciary take us into new territory”); Julie 
Hirschfeld Davis, Supreme Court Nominee Calls Trump’s Attacks on Judiciary ‘Demoralizing,’ 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/08/us/politics/donald -trump-
immigration-ban.html [https://perma.cc/6JQF-7TVT] (quoting the opinion of former George W. 
Bush judicial appointee Michael McConnell that “Mr. Trump is shredding longstanding norms of 
etiquette and interbranch comity”). 
 275. See, e.g., Scott Shane, Is News of Terror Attacks Underplayed? Experts Say No, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/07/us/politics/terrorist-attack-media-coverage-
trump.html [https://perma.cc/5GT8-TW4T] (“ ‘Pre-emptive blame,’ said [Martha] Crenshaw, the 
Stanford terrorism researcher. ‘Nothing’s happened. But if something does happen, he can blame 
the judiciary and the news media.’ ”); see also Max Fisher & Kitty Bennett, Our Articles on the 
Attacks Trump Says the Media Didn’t Cover, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/07/us/politics/the-white-house-list-of-terror-attacks-
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President publicly asserted that because of a “ridiculous” federal 
district court decision by a “so-called judge” stopping enforcement of his 
initial executive order on immigration and refugees, “many very bad 
and dangerous people may be pouring into our country,” and that the 
decision “opens up our country to potential terrorists and others that do 
not have our best interests at heart.”276 He also contended that if the 
federal government does not prevail in the litigation involving the 
legality of the order, “we can never have the security and safety to which 
we are entitled.”277 He then deemed “disgraceful” the appellate hearing 
(initiated by his administration) before a panel of three judges of the 
Ninth Circuit.278 He condemned the panel even though it was composed 
of Republican and Democratic appointees alike who, in asking difficult 
questions of both sides, were each models of professionalism and 
competence.279 The panel was subsequently unanimous in rejecting the 
administration’s position in the appeal.280  
The President’s public antagonism and ad hominem attacks are 
causing many commentators to opine that the President is 
preemptively engaging in blame shifting in the event of a terrorist 
attack.281 More disturbingly, a few commentators have expressed the 
concern that the President may be trying to establish a narrative that 
 
underreported-by-media.html?mtrref=www.google.com [https://perma.cc/57A6-EW3G] (stating 
that President Trump claims the media is not sufficiently reporting terrorist attacks, and 
providing links to media sources that reported on the White House’s list of terrorist attacks from 
September 2014 to December 2016). 
 276. The President’s tweets that are quoted in the text are collected and analyzed by Jack 
Goldsmith, Does Donald Trump Want to Lose the EO Battle in Court? Or Is Donald McGahn 
Simply Ineffectual (or Worse)?, LAWFARE (Feb. 6, 2017, 8:22 AM), https://lawfareblog.com/does-
trump-want-lose-eo-battle-court-or-donald-mcgahn-simply-ineffectual-or-worse [https://perma.cc/ 
4FLE-DAZK]. 
 277. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 8, 2017, 4:03 AM), https://twitter 
.com/realdonaldtrump/status/829299566344359936?lang=en [https://perma.cc/5F2N-XZ7Q].  
 278. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 274 (quoting Trump’s characterization of the hearing before 
the Ninth Circuit panel as “disgraceful”).  
 279. Audio of the oral argument before the Ninth Circuit panel, which took place on February 
7, 2017, is available online. Oral Argument, Washington v. Trump, No. 17-35105 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 
2017), http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view_video.php?pk_vid=0000010884 [https://perma.cc/ 
Q7H9-WA34]. 
 280. Washington v. Trump, No. 17-35105 (9th Cir. Feb. 9, 2017) (per curiam) (order denying 
emergency motion for stay pending appeal), http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2017/ 
02/09/17-35105.pdf [https://perma.cc/6A3A-EQWK]. 
 281. See, e.g., Philip Rucker, ‘If Something Happens’: Trump Points His Finger in Case of a 
Terrorist Attack, WASH. POST (Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/if-
something-happens-trump-points-his-finger-in-case-of-a-terror-attack/2017/02/06/8e315b78-eca6-
11e6-9662-6eedf1627882_story.html?utm_term=.aecde82fa795 [https://perma.cc/TH3Q-QYGP] 
(“President Trump appears to be laying the groundwork to preemptively shift blame for any future 
terrorist attack on U.S. soil from his administration to the federal judiciary, as well as to the 
media.”); Shane, supra note 275 (same). 
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he can use after an attack in order to rally a fearful public into accepting 
his disregard of judicial authority.282 Although the courts are currently 
asserting their authority, they will inevitably become more politically 
vulnerable after an attack, especially a significant one.283  
If the political environment for judicial independence becomes 
more treacherous, it is reasonable to predict (although by no means 
certain) that the process of reciprocal legitimation, or something like it, 
will unfold. Proceeding incrementally and finding strength in numbers 
is one potentially effective way for judges to rebut the President’s 
repeated charges to his millions of Twitter followers that federal courts 
are illegitimate because the judicial decisions going against him are 
political. The situation may be somewhat reminiscent of the Court’s 
public projection of unanimity in Brown.284 President Trump’s 
accusations and conduct, as well as the disaggregated nature of the 
litigation in response to his executive orders (that is, different suits filed 
in different courts), may cause federal judges to find greater strength 
in numbers than they would otherwise be likely to achieve.285  
If that happens, there will be a certain irony in it: by 
unjustifiably deriding the federal courts as political, the President will 
have succeeded in encouraging them to act politically, at least to some 
extent, in order to safeguard their own public legitimacy. But if events 
unfold in that fashion, the federal courts will be acting politically in 
arguably the most defensible sense of the word—in the sense of 
statesmanship, not partisanship.286 And the potential defensibility of 
judicial statesmanship in response to unjustified attacks on the public 
legitimacy of courts illuminates why it is overstated to condemn 
 
 282. Curtis Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Judicial and Media Independence After the Next Attack, 
LAWFARE (Feb. 9, 2017, 5:41 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/judicial-and-media-independence 
-after-next-attack [https://perma.cc/4F9B-AALM]; Paul Krugman, When the Fire Comes, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/10/opinion/when-the-fire-comes.html 
[https://perma.cc/29R7-NPRY]. 
 283. See Bradley & Siegel, supra note 282 (making this point). 
 284. See supra text accompanying note 93 (observing that the Brown Court was in fact 
divided). Ideologically diverse Justices may at times stick together to protect judicial power when 
it is under threat. In addition to Brown, see, for example, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 
(1974), and Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).  
 285. Cf., e.g., Baker, supra note 274 (quoting the opinion of Jack Goldsmith that “[t]he 
sloppiness and aggressiveness of the directives, combined with the attacks on judges, put extra 
pressure on judges to rule against Trump”). 
 286. See generally Siegel, supra note 87 (offering a theoretical account of the phenomenon of 
judicial statesmanship, which counsels judges to take some account of the conditions of their own 
public legitimacy). 
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reciprocal legitimation in all circumstances for compromising judicial 
candor.287 
 
 287. Cf. Eric Posner, Judges v. Trump: Be Careful What You Wish For, N.Y TIMES (Feb. 15, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/15/opinion/judges-v-trump-be-careful-what-you-wish-for 
.html?_r=1 [https://perma.cc/9CYQ-V72B] (“The courts were playing politics, but of a valid 
constitutional kind.”). 
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APPENDIX 
Voting Behavior of Circuit Court Judges in Recent  
Same-Sex Marriage Cases 
(Votes against a purely partisan prediction are noted in bold.) 
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